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This dissertation contains three essays, each on a different aspect of the 
economics of smoking bans and smoking control policy. 
Essay One explores the link between cigarette excise taxes, state fiscal 
considerations, and attitudes towards smoking.  Do legislatures use cigarette taxes only to 
generate revenue or also as a policy tool to control smoking?  The paper shows that the 
level of cigarette excise tax does not seem to be related to anti-smoking sentiment.  
Signing the Master Settlement Agreement by the states and major tobacco firms seems to 
have been an impetus for states to raise cigarette taxes.  States that enacted smoking ban 
legislation over the sample period were also more likely to turn to cigarette excise taxes 
in times of fiscal stress. 
In Essay Two, the effects of complete smoking bans in restaurants and bars on the 
prevalence and intensity of smoking are examined.  The results of the paper suggest that 
complete smoking bans have little impact on the prevalence of smoking and have a mixed 
impact on the intensity of cigarette consumption.  While complete bar bans do reduce the 
number of cigarettes smoked, complete restaurant bans increase the average number of 
cigarettes smoked. 
Essay Three uses micro-data at the household level to examine the effect that 
complete restaurant smoking bans have on the household’s dining out expenditures.  The 
essay finds that the bans have no discernable effect on the level of dining out 
expenditures for non-smoking and smoking households.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Chapter II of the dissertation explores the role that cigarette excise taxes play in 
smoking control policy.  Since 2001, cigarette tax rates have increased along with the 
number and stringency of clean indoor air laws, while other sin tax rates have not 
increased.  Have legislatures begun to use cigarette taxes as a tool to control smoking, or 
are they still primarily a means of generating revenue?   
Some of the increase in cigarette taxes may have been spurred by the declining 
fiscal situation states faced in 2002 and 2003.  Despite the rebound in state fiscal health 
after 2003, the increases in cigarette tax rates continued unabated through 2007.  If the 
increase in cigarette taxes had been driven by a heightened need for revenue, other taxes 
that states raise in difficult economic times should have risen as well.  While other sin 
taxes did increase from 1999 to 2007, the increases were much smaller than the cigarette 
excise tax increase.  For example, during the 2001 to 2007 period, the tax rates on beer 
and gas rose 0.5 percent and 2.4 percent respectively compared to the 16.5 percent 
increase for cigarette taxes.   
Why did cigarette tax rates continue to increase while other sin tax rates did not?  
One possible explanation is that growing smoking control sentiment within states drove 
the increase.  If other measures of smoking control also increased at the same time, then 
perhaps states were using cigarette taxes as a means of smoking control.  If, however, 
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other smoking control measures did not increase, then some other explanation for the 
continued rise in cigarette tax rates is needed. 
One smoking control measure states can adopt is smoking bans.  The number and 
severity of smoking bans increased after 2001.  The increases in taxes and the number 
and severity of smoking bans suggest that the increase in cigarette tax rates and the 
increase in smoking bans could be related.  Chapter One examines if the cigarette excise 
tax increases seen after 2001 were the result of state revenue needs, or were associated 
with the increase in the strength and number of smoking bans and anti-smoking 
sentiment, and a policy instrument to curb smoking.   
The essay contributes to the literature by showing that states did not increase 
cigarette excise taxes to reduce the prevalence of smoking but rather because of the 
Master Settlement Agreement.  In addition, states that have already passed complete 
smoking ban legislation turned more readily to increased cigarette taxes than those states 
that did not pass any new complete smoking ban legislation. 
In Chapter III, the recent increase in complete statewide smoking bans in 
restaurants and bars had on smoking prevalence and intensity is investigated.  While 
complete workplace smoking bans are thought to reduce the prevalence and intensity of 
smoking due to the large amount of time individuals spend at work, individuals spend 
significantly less time at restaurants and bars.  In addition, because they can choose not to 
frequent restaurants and bars, the effect of the bans should presumably be smaller.  
However, because dining out and frequenting bars is a recreational activity, the desire to 
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participate in these activities may outweigh the negative impacts of the bans for smokers, 
and they may choose to refrain from smoking to dine out and visit bars. 
The results of the essay indicate that absolute smoking bans in private worksites, 
restaurants, and bars appear to have little effect on smoking prevalence.  The results for 
the intensity of consumption were mixed, with private worksite bans having no effect, 
restaurant bans increasing consumption, and bar bans reducing consumption. 
Two possible explanations for the surprising result that complete restaurant bans 
increased the consumption of cigarettes are suggested.  First, smokers give up dining out 
and eat at home.  Income that was once spent on dining out was redirected to the 
consumption of other goods including cigarettes.  The effect of restaurant smoking bans 
on the dining out behavior is addressed in Chapter IV.  If in fact smokers do reduce their 
dining out expenditures, this would support the hypothesis that smokers are refraining 
from frequenting restaurants and instead are eating at home.  
Another possible explanation could be the reaction of restaurants to complete 
bans.  If restaurants are responding to complete bans with increased outdoor seating 
options, it may be that the bans did not reduce the amount of cigarettes that smokers 
consumed because instead of forcing smokers outside to smoke, the restaurants moved 
the dining out experience outside where the smokers could continue to smoke.  If 
smokers previously would have refrained from smoking in mixed parties of smokers and 
non-smokers while indoors, they may not have felt such a compulsion sitting outside 
because they believed they were inconveniencing or harming their non-smoking friends 
less while outside. 
4 
Chapter IV explores the effect of complete restaurant smoking bans on dining out 
expenditures.  Since the early 1990’s a growing number of local governments and states 
have completely banned smoking in restaurants and bars.  Proponents of smoking bans 
argue that government regulation is required to protect the health of workers and patrons 
in restaurants and bars because of externalities associated with second-hand smoke 
caused by the smoking of cigarettes.  Opponents argue that smoking bans will reduce 
restaurant revenues and employment. 
While previous studies of the effect of smoking bans on dining out expenditures 
have used aggregate data, such as employment and sales tax receipts or perceptions of 
restaurant proprietors and managers, none has investigated how individual consumers 
react to smoking bans.  The disaggregated effects of smoking bans may be very different 
from the aggregate effect.  Presumably, families with smokers decreased their 
expenditures on dining out in response to complete restaurant smoking bans, while 
families without smokers increased their expenditures on dining out. 
The results of the essay indicate that complete restaurant smoking bans did not 
change the expenditures on dining out by non-smoking or smoking households.  While 
the estimated coefficients conformed to expectations, the lack of precision in the 
estimates prevents any definitive conclusions from being drawn about the effect of 
smoking bans on dining out expenditures. 
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CHAPTER  II 
CIGARETTE EXCISE TAXES: REVENUE ONLY OR DOES  
ANTI-SMOKING SENTIMENT MATTER AS WELL? 
 
Introduction 
Since 1921, when Iowa enacted the first cigarette tax1, state legislatures have used 
cigarette excise taxes to raise revenue.  In recent years, however, health advocacy and 
smoking prevention groups2 have urged legislatures to raise cigarette taxes as part of 
comprehensive smoking prevention programs.  Since 2001, cigarette tax rates have 
increased along with the number and stringency of clean indoor air laws, while other sin 
tax rates have not increased.  Have legislatures begun to use cigarette taxes as a tool to 
control smoking, or are they still primarily a means of generating revenue?  
From 1995 to 2001, the average state cigarette tax rate increased from 30 to 40 
cents per pack, an annual rate of 5.3 percent.  After 2001, cigarette excise tax rates 
increased rapidly; and by 2007, the average tax rate had reached one dollar per pack, an 
annual increase of 16.5 percent from 2001 to 2007.  Some of the increases may have been 
spurred by the declining fiscal situation states faced in 2002 and 2003.  As can be seen in 
Figure 2.1, states’ general fund ending balances grew to above 9 percent in 2000, fell in 
2001 and 2002, and did not begin to recover until 2004. 
                                                 
1 The Tax Foundation website: http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/topic/103.html 
2 The groups included the American Lung Association, American Heart Association, American Society of 
Clinical Oncology, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, and the Foundation for a Smokefree America. 
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By 2006, ending balances were again above 10 percent on average.  Despite the 
rebound in state fiscal health, the increases in cigarette tax rates continued unabated 
through 20073.  If the increase in cigarette taxes had been driven by a heightened need for 
revenue, other taxes that states raise in difficult economic times should have risen as well.  
Comparing the increase in tax rate for cigarettes to some other sin tax rates in Figure 2.2, 
it is apparent that while other taxes did increase from 1999 to 2007, the increases were 
much smaller than the cigarette excise tax increase.  For example, during the 2001 to 
2007 period, the tax rates on beer and gas rose 0.5 percent and 2.4 percent respectively 
compared to the 16.5 percent increase for cigarette taxes. 
                                                 
3 Based on commentary from the National Association of Budget Officers Fiscal Survey of the States, 
various years.  http://www.nasbo.org/publicationsReport.php. 
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The question arises, why did cigarette tax rates continue to increase while other 
sin tax rates did not?  One possible explanation is that growing smoking control 
sentiment within states drove the increase.  If other measures of smoking control also 
increased at the same time, then perhaps states were using cigarette taxes as a means of 
smoking control.  If, however, other smoking control measures did not increase, then 
some other explanation for the continued rise in cigarette tax rates is needed. 
One smoking control measure states can adopt is smoking bans.  Figure 2.3 
compares the average cigarette tax rate and an average of an index of state level smoking 
8 
bans4.  As can be seen in the figure, the ban index (made up of the number and severity of 
bans in each state) also began a rapid increase after 2001.  The two series follow similar 
paths, suggesting that the increase in cigarette tax rates and the increase in smoking bans 
could be related. 
While the smoking ban index average increased from 2001 to 2007, fourteen of 
the 49 states5 in the analysis did not change any smoking ban legislation over the sample 
period of 1995 to 2007.  To look at the differences between the states that did change 
their smoking ban legislation and those that did not6, each group will be examined 
separately7. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The smoking ban index was calculated from the CDC’s State System by assigning each type of smoking 
ban in place during the fourth quarter of each year in private work sites, restaurants, bars, enclosed spaces, 
hospitals, grocery stores, government buildings, and malls a strength score, and then summing up the total 
score for each state. The strength of each ban was measured as: No ban – 0, Smoking in Designated Areas 
Only – 1, Smoking in Separately Ventilated Areas Only – 2, Smoking Completely Banned – 3.  The index 
could range from 0 to 24.  The Cronbach’s reliability score for the index was 0. 9178. 
5 Alaska is not included in the analysis for reasons discussed in the data section. 
6 The fourteen states were: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
7 The sample is being divided for two reasons, first, intuitively, legislatures that have not enacted any new 
smoking restrictions during the entire period of examination do not seem interested in reducing smoking 
prevalence in their state.  Second, splitting the sample rather than interacting the variables reduces the 
number of potentially endogenous variables that need to be investigated. 
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This essay, examines if the cigarette excise tax increases seen after 2001 are the 
result of state revenue needs, or are associated with the increase in the strength and 
number of smoking bans and anti-smoking sentiment and a policy instrument to curb 
smoking.  The essay contributes to the literature by showing that states did not increase 
cigarette excise taxes to reduce the prevalence of smoking, but rather because of the 
Master Settlement Agreement.  In addition, states that have already passed complete 
smoking ban legislation turned more readily to increased cigarette taxes than those states 
that did not pass any new complete smoking ban legislation.  A brief review of the 
relevant literature is presented next, followed by the modeling framework and data, the 
results, and finally, a brief discussion and interpretation of the results. 
10 
Relevant Literature 
Within the economic literature on smoking, substantial work has been completed 
on evaluating the effectiveness of smoking bans as a deterrent to smoking and estimating 
the price elasticity of cigarettes, but only a few studies have looked at the determinants of 
the differences in cigarette excise tax rates between states.  Research on smoking bans 
has shown they are an effective means of reducing smoking prevalence (Chaloupka and 
Grossman, 1996; Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997; Evans et al., 1999; Ohsfeldt et al., 
1998).  With regard to cigarette excise taxes, nearly all of an excise tax increase is passed 
on to consumers through price increases (Keeler et al., 1996, and Stehr, 2007), making 
excise taxes an extremely effective way of increasing the price of cigarettes.   
Numerous studies have been completed on the effect of cigarette price increases 
on smoking habits, including the decision to smoke and the quantity of cigarettes 
consumed.  Most of the studies concluded that price increases were an effective means of 
reducing smoking, with overall price elasticities of demand generally in the range of -0.3 
to -0.5 (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).  Some groups who are more price sensitive 
included blacks and Hispanics compared to whites, men compared to women, and those 
with lower incomes compared with those who have higher incomes (Townsend et al., 
19948; Farrelly, et al, 1998, Chaloupka and Pacula, 1999).  Based on this body of 
research, excise tax increases are an effective means to reduce smoking prevalence and 
cigarette consumption. 
                                                 
8 Townsend et al. concluded that women were more responsive to price than men, differing from the other 
studies mentioned. 
11 
Research studies into the determinants of state cigarette tax rates were more 
limited and include Benjamin and Dougan (1997), Hoover (2003), and Devereux et al. 
(2007).  Benjamin and Dougan investigated how cigarette tax rates differed as the 
distance from North Carolina increased, as 60 percent of cigarette production is 
concentrated in North Carolina9.  They found that, up to 800 miles, cigarette taxes 
increased as the distance from North Carolina increased because more distant states 
benefit from the intervening states efforts to combat smuggling.  They found that for 
every 3 cents an intervening state raises its cigarette tax, a state can raise its own cigarette 
tax by 1 cent.  Past 800 miles, transportation costs began to decrease demand for 
cigarettes and, hence, the optimal tax rate. 
Hoover examined how non-revenue factors influenced the level of cigarette tax 
rates.  Specifically, he investigated how the level of giving to the American Cancer 
Society and the Project ASSISST program impacted cigarette tax rates.  He found that 
neither program had much of an impact.  Some variables that were positively associated 
with the level of cigarette taxes in a state included the percentage of college graduates 
and the percentage of the population over age 65, while political conservatism in a state, 
the level of tobacco production, the percent of the population who are 18-24, and per 
capita consumption of cigarettes were all negatively associated with tax rates.  One 
interesting finding of the paper was that the percent of the population 18-24 was 
negatively related to cigarette taxes.  Presumably, one reason to raise cigarette taxes is 
because youth are more price sensitive consumers, and tax increases have been shown to 
                                                 
9 Most other cigarette production occurs in Virginia and Kentucky. 
12 
be an effective means of reducing smoking prevalence among youth (Tauras and 
Chaloupka, 1999; Czart, Pacula, and Chaloupka, 2001). 
The Devereux et al. paper examined horizontal and vertical cigarette excise tax 
competition between states and the federal government.  They found that cigarette excise 
tax policy in a state was highly responsive to tax policy in neighboring states, while 
relatively unresponsive to federal cigarette excise tax rates.  The paper models both 
cigarette excise tax rates and changes in the rate, because nominal rate changes do not 
occur frequently.  In addition to the federal cigarette tax rate and neighboring states 
cigarette excise tax rates, the authors included national and state economic and 
demographic variables.   
At the national level, the variables included gross domestic product, the national 
unemployment rate, and consumer price index.  For each state, the authors utilized 
tobacco production in the state, per capita income, the state unemployment rate, federal 
grants, and the state income tax rate for the state economic variables.  The demographic 
variables, total population and the percent of the population, both young and old, were 
included.  Finally, several measures of the political climate in the state were added 
including the party of the governor, the proportion of Democrats in the House and in the 
Senate, a dummy variable indicating whether the current governor is term-limited, and an 
election year dummy.  For the tax rate analysis, the significant variables included the 
neighbor states’ tax rates; the state’s own tax rate lagged one period and, in one 
specification, the amount of federal grants the state received and the election year 
dummy.  For the tax change analysis, the level of neighboring states’ taxes was 
13 
significant, as was inflation, the debt level of the state, the election year dummy, and 
states with Democrats in control.  All increased the probability of an increase in cigarette 
tax rates. 
Despite the interest in using cigarette excise taxes and smoking bans to reduce 
smoking prevalence, relatively little research has been done on the relationship between 
them.  If the goal of cigarette taxes is to raise revenue, then smoking bans are substitutes 
because they reduce the prevalence of smoking and hence the amount of revenue a 
cigarette excise tax can raise.  However, if the goal is to reduce smoking, then the two are 
compliments.   
From a theoretical perspective, Prinz (2009) shows how democratic states can 
want to enact both cigarette taxes and smoking bans.  Using a majority voting model, 
Prinz shows that if smokers are in the majority then cigarette tax rates will be set to zero.  
If non-smokers who never associate with smokers are in the majority, tax rates are greater 
than optimal and non-smokers appropriate rent from smokers.  If non-smokers who 
associate with smokers are the decisive group, then tax rates are set so that tax revenues 
are equal to spillover costs.  Prinz then proceeds to show that even if the cigarette tax rate 
is optimal, society may choose to impose smoking bans.  By imposing smoking bans, the 
spillover costs due to smoking are reduced by decreasing the amount of second hand 
cigarette smoke non-smokers are exposed to regularly.  Part of the reduction of spillover 
costs has been taken over by smoking bans, which reduces the optimal tax rate.  If the tax 
rate remains the same, then the transfer of rent from smokers to non-smokers is increased. 
14 
Two empirical studies indirectly examined the relationship between cigarette 
taxes and smoking bans.  In the first paper, Gallet, Hoover, and Lee (2006), were primary 
interested in the determinants of statewide smoking bans.  They did include cigarette 
taxes in their model, theorizing that: 
 
. . . state-level tax rates on cigarettes are included to control for possible 
substitutability or complementarity between taxes and smoking bans. It 
may be, for example, that if states adopt a general anti-smoking position, 
taxes could be used in conjunction with smoking bans to reduce tobacco 
consumption. In this case, higher tax rates will correlate with a greater 
probability of adopting a smoking ban. Alliteratively, it may be that states 
are particularly keen on raising tax revenue and view taxes as competing 
with smoking bans. Therefore, if higher tax rates are adopted in an effort 
to raise tax revenue, then states will be less likely to adopt smoking bans, 
which reduce demand and tax revenue10. 
 
 
They found that cigarette taxes were not compliments to smoking bans and used 
to curb smoking, but rather are substitutes to smoking bans for the purpose of raising 
revenue.  However, their analysis only examined through the year 2000, prior to the 
enactment of the more numerous and stringent smoking bans and large increases in 
cigarette excise tax rates. 
Trogden and Sloan (2006) investigated the effect that the Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) between the states and major cigarette manufacturers had on cigarette 
excise taxes.  Their primary finding was that cigarette excise taxes rose in 1998, the year 
the MSA was signed, by about 10 cents, likely due to the weakened political position of 
                                                 
10 Gallet, Craig A., Hoover, Gary A., and Junsoo Lee.  2006, “Putting Out Fires: An Examination of the 
Determinants of State Clean Indoor-Air Laws.” Southern Economic Journal, Volume 73, Issue 1, page 114 
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the tobacco industry.  Cigarette excise tax rates then remained stable from 1999 to 2002.  
They also found that “Extensive clean air laws lead to lower excise taxes on cigarettes 
(substitutability), but basic clean air laws relative to no clean air laws lead to higher 
excise taxes (complementary)” (pg. 735). 
Other variables that were positively associated with higher cigarette taxes 
included higher taxes in neighboring states; Democratic control of the state’s legislature, 
lower general fund ending balances, and the percent of population aged 18-24.  Factors 
associated with lower cigarette excise taxes included smoking prevalence, the presence of 
smoker protection laws, and higher per capita real income.  The Trogden and Sloan paper 
covered the years 1990 through 2002, during which only eight states changed their clean 
air laws.  These two studies generally concluded that smoking bans and cigarette taxes 
have not been used jointly to reduce smoking prevalence and intensity; however, they 
have all used data prior to the large upswing in states enacting stricter smoking bans and 
large increase in cigarette excise tax rates after 2002. 
 
Modeling Framework 
To determine if the recent increase in cigarette taxes was driven by revenue 
concerns or an increase in anti-smoking sentiment, state cigarette excise tax rates were 
regressed against several smoking relate variables, fiscal variables, and other control 
variables.  The smoking variables included attitudes towards smoking bans and smoking 
prevalence.  States with high levels of anti-smoking sentiment as measured by a smoking 
ban attitude index or that have a lower prevalence of smoking were expected to have 
16 
higher tax rates.  The fiscal variables included the state’s general fund ending balance and 
the maximum and minimum cigarette tax in adjacent states.  States were expected to 
increase the level of the cigarette excise tax in response to deteriorating fiscal conditions 
and as surrounding states raised their cigarette tax rates.  Finally, additional control 
variables included the quantity of tobacco grown in the state, a measure of political 
philosophy, and both pre- Master Settlement Agreement (MSA11) and post-MSA time 
trends12. 
The following equations were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
OLS with fixed effects.  Both equations were estimated with cluster robust standard 
errors: 
(2.1) ststst eXy    
(2.2) stsstst euXy    
where, yst was the nominal cigarette tax rate per pack in cents, Xst was the matrix 
of explanatory variables,  was a vector of coefficients, est was the error term, and us was 
the state fixed effect.  State fixed-effects were used to capture other sources of time 
persistent unobserved heterogeneity between states. 
The independent variables included smoking prevalence.  It is quite possible that 
smoking prevalence is endogenous and jointly determined with the cigarette excise tax 
                                                 
11 “In 1998, the Attorneys General of 46 states signed the Master Settlement Agreement with the four 
largest tobacco companies in the United States to settle state suits to recover billions of dollars in costs 
associated with treating smoking-related illnesses. Four states - Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas 
- settled their tobacco cases separately from the MSA states and are therefore not signatories to the MSA.  
The MSA created a broad array of restrictions on the advertising, marketing and promotion of cigarettes.”  
National Association of Attorneys General Website - http://www.naag.org/tobacco.php 
12 The time trend was modeled using a spline with a kink point at 1999 since the MSA was signed in 1998.  
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rate.  To account for this, the equations were re-estimated using instrumental variables 
techniques and the endogeneity of smoking prevalence variable was tested. 
Both the pooled and fixed effects specifications were estimated using two sub-
samples of states.  Fourteen states did not change their smoking ban laws during the 
sample time frame.  It seems plausible that these fourteen states had less interest in 
reducing the prevalence of smoking and were fundamentally different from the states that 
did enact a complete smoking ban change.  Including these states with the states that did 
change their smoking ban laws assumes that the explanatory variables influence the 
cigarette excise tax rate in the two sets of states similarly. 
To test if differences exist between these two sets of states, a dummy variable was 
included in equations 2.1 and 2.2 representing the non-change states.  The non-change 
dummy variable was also fully interacted with all of the other explanatory variables.  An 
F-test of the equality of the coefficients between the change states and non-changes states 
produced a test statistics of F(10, 568) = 1.65 in the pooled regression, and F(9, 560) = 
1.95 in the fixed effects regression.  The null that the coefficients on the ban change and 
non-change states are the same was rejected at the 10 percent level in the pooled model 
and at the 5 percent level in the fixed effects model.  Therefore, the sample was split into 
the two different sub-samples. 
To test for the presence of serial correlation, the test developed by Wooldridge 
(2002) for serial correlation in panel data sets as implemented by the STATA “xtserial” 
command was utilized.  The test rejected the null hypothesis of no first order serial 
correlation with an F-statistic of: F(1, 48) = 70.7.  To correct for the serial correlation, the 
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data were transformed using xt
* = xt - (ρ * xt-1), where ρ varied by increments of 0.01 from 
–1 to 1.  Then, for each increment of ρ, the data were retested for serial correlation.  The 
F-statistic for each iteration was examined, and the ρ with the smallest F-statistic was 
used to transform the data for analysis.  The final ρ was 0.68, at which point the H0: of no 
serial correlation could not be rejected with an F-statistic of F(1, 48) = 0.00.  All of the 
continuous variables were transformed using xt
* = xt - (0.68 * xt-1), while indicator 
variables remained 0 or 1. 
 
Data  
The data for the study were drawn from the following sources.  Cigarette Tax 
information came from “The Tax Burden on Tobacco, Historical Compilation, Volume 
43, 2008”.  The fiscal condition variable came from the National Association of Budget 
Officers Fiscal Survey of the States.  Attitudes towards smoking bans and household 
smoking policy data were collected from the Current Population Survey - Tobacco Use 
Supplement (CPS-TUS).  The measure of conservatism in a state was obtained from the 
American Conservative Union (ACU).  Tobacco production data came from the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Finally, the smoking prevalence and the 
health related instrument variables were all obtained from the Center for Disease 
Control’s (CDC) Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance System.  For most of the variables, 
data are available from 1995 through 2007.  Data were collected for 49 states, as Alaska 
and the District of Columbia were excluded from the analysis13. 
                                                 
13 Alaska was excluded from the survey because of its unique revenue situation.  
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The dependant variable, the nominal cigarette excise tax per pack14, was taken 
from “The Tax Burden on Tobacco, Historical Compilation, Volume 43, 2008”, 
published by the consulting firm of Orzechowski and Walker.  The Tax Burden contains 
a wealth of detailed information on state and federal excise tax rates, tobacco prices, and 
tobacco consumption.   
Cigarette tax rates in the sample ranged from a low of 2.5 cents per pack to a high 
of $2.58 per pack.  The average cigarette excise tax rate in 1994 was $0.26, while in 2007 
it was $1.01.  The largest tax rate increase was in New Jersey, which increased its 
cigarette tax rate by $2.18.  During the sample, only 5 states did not increase their 
cigarette tax rate (Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, and South Carolina).  
The adjacent state minimum and maximum cigarette tax rates were also taken 
from the Orzechowski and Walker publication.  Adjacent state minimum and maximum 
cigarette taxes were included in the model because state legislatures are cognizant of the 
potential for smuggling if cigarette excise tax levels become too divergent and keep 
surrounding states’ tax levels in mind when setting tax policy (Benjamin and Dougan, 
1997; Trogden and Sloan, 2006). 
The Fiscal Survey of States is published twice yearly by the National Association 
of State Budget Officers (NASBO) and the National Governors Association.  Each 
survey contains both individual state and aggregate data on the states’ general fund 
receipts, expenditures, and balances.  While general fund receipts and expenditures do 
                                                 
14 The nominal tax per pack was chosen as the dependant variable because state legislatures set the nominal 
tax rate per pack. 
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not represent all state spending, these funds are used to finance most broad-based state 
services.  They play an important role in determining the fiscal health of the states and 
represent a reasonable measure of a state’s fiscal health.  The ending balance from the 
each state’s general fund and rainy day funds was calculated as a percentage of total 
general fund expenditures and was used as the measure of fiscal health for each state.  
Due to the lag in passing and enacting legislation, general fund ending balances lagged 
one year were used.   
General fund ending balances vary from -20 percent to 57 percent.  In 1996, the 
average state general fund ending balance was 7.9 percent.  The average grew to 9.9 
percent during the prosperity of the late 1990s.  The recession of 2001 and 2002 caused 
ending balances fall to a low of 4.1 percent in 2002 and 2003, before rebounding to 12.9 
percent in 2007. 
The main purpose of the CPS is to collect information on the employment status 
from approximately 57,000 surveyed households each month; however, the Census 
Bureau occasionally asks supplemental questions about other topics, including tobacco 
consumption and attitudes towards smoking and smoking control measures.  The 
Tobacco Use Supplement (TUS) has been conducted approximately every three years, 
with the most recent TUS occurring in 2006 and 2007. 
Along with questions about cigarette use, the TUS contains questions about the 
individuals’ attitudes towards smoking bans in various locations including restaurants, 
bars, indoor sporting venues, and workplaces.  Additionally, the respondent’s home 
smoking policy was determined.  DeCicca, et al. (2006), examined nine different 
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measures of attitudes towards smoking bans, restrictions on tobacco advertising, and 
home smoking policies from the TUS, and find that all nine derived from a common 
factor which they label “anti-smoking sentiment.”  Using the nine measures they 
constructed an index that measured attitudes towards smoking.   
Because all nine questions were not asked in the more recent Tobacco Use 
Supplements, an index of attitudes towards smoking bans was created using the four 
available smoking ban attitude questions and the home smoking policy question for each 
individual in the survey.  All of the individual attitude index numbers were averaged by 
state and year to derive state attitude index values.  A complete description of the 
calculation of the index is presented in Appendix A.  The CPS-TUS data was available 
for all years except 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2005.  A linear extrapolation from the 
available years was used to estimate the smoking attitude index for the missing years15.  
In 1995, the average smoking ban attitude index was 11.8, with a minimum value 
of 10.8 and maximum of 12.7.  By 2007, the average was 13.1; the minimum was 12.1; 
and the maximum was 13.9.  If states were using cigarette excise taxes as a policy tool, 
higher smoking ban attitude index values would be associated with higher cigarette tax 
rates. 
The political conservatism index was constructed by averaging the rankings given 
to every member of Congress each year by the ACU.  Members were ranked based on 
their votes for 20 key issues each year.  For every vote the ACU considers conservative, 
the member was awarded 5 points.  Scores could range from 0 to 100, with 100 a perfect 
                                                 
15 The sensitivity of the results to the interpolation of the data is presented in the Results section. 
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conservative score.  Each state’s house and senate members’ scores were averaged, and 
then the house and senate scores were averaged together to derive the state score.  The 
most liberal states according to the index included Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont 
with average rankings under 10.  The most conservative states were Idaho, Oklahoma, 
and Wyoming with average rankings above 90.  The average ranking was 50.7 in 1995, 
which increased to 54.8 by 2002; was largely flat through 2005; and then fell again to 
42.8 in 2007. 
Tobacco production data were gathered from the United States Department of 
Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service publication Agricultural Statistics.  
Production in 2007 was 778.6 million pounds of leaf tobacco.  This was down from 2,444 
million pounds in 1995.  Tobacco production was dominated by two states, North 
Carolina and Kentucky, which together produced almost 75 percent of total production in 
2007.  South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Tennessee made up most of the rest of the 
production, 22 percent.  These six states together accounted for 96 percent of total leaf 
tobacco production in the United States.  All together, tobacco production occurred in 16 
states in the sample. 
The BRFSS is a national health survey conducted annually by all of the states in 
conjunction with the CDC.  The survey collects information on health risk behaviors, 
health practices, health care access, and general demographics about the respondents.  In 
2006, more than 350,000 adults were interviewed by phone.  Variables used from the 
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BRFSS include state smoking prevalence, the percent of the state’s population in good 
health16, and the state’s drinking prevalence. 
Because smoking prevalence is potentially endogenous, instrumental variables 
techniques were used to account for the potential endogeneity.  The following variables 
were possible instruments because “nearly all econometric studies of cigarette demand 
use a variety of factors to control for tastes, including gender, race, education, marital 
status, employment status, and religiosity” (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000, pg.1547).  
Smoking was more prevalent among males (Davis et al, 2007; and Tauras, 2006), whites 
compared to Hispanics, Asians, and blacks (Decker and Schwartz, 2000; Davis et al, 
2007; and Tauras, 2006), and unmarried individuals versus those in a permanent 
relationship (Decker and Schwartz, 2000; and Tauras, 2006). 
Additionally, the percent of the population reporting good health was a potential 
instrument because the Surgeon General has concluded that tobacco smoking is the 
“single greatest cause of avoidable morbidity and mortality in the United States” and 
“smoking generally diminishes the health of smokers” (Surgeon General, 2004, 
Executive Summary pg.1).   Because smoking is so harmful to health, the percentage of 
individuals reporting good health should be inversely related to the prevalence of 
smoking.  Data from the 2005 BRFSS showed that 18.2 percent of the interview subject 
who reported being in good, very good, or excellent health smoked, compared to 25.8 
percent of the respondents who reported fair or poor health. 
                                                 
16 The percent of the population reporting good health is actually the percent who reported good, very good, 
or excellent health, however the BRFSS’s reported prevalence statistics combine these three categories 
together. 
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Finally, drinking prevalence was included as a potential instrument.  Statistics 
from the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health from the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Service Administration showed a strong correlation between alcohol and 
tobacco consumption.  For non-binge current drinkers, 19.2 percent had smoked 
cigarettes in the past month compared to 16.1 percent for abstainers.  The report also 
stated: “Use of illicit drugs and alcohol was more common among current cigarette 
smokers than among nonsmokers in 2008, as in prior years since 2002” (pg. 50).  
Additionally, studies have documented the increased use of tobacco among consumers of 
alcohol (Burton and Tiffany, 1997; and Gulliver et. al., 1995).   Because tobacco use is 
more common among drinkers, states with a higher prevalence of drinking are also likely 
to have a higher prevalence of smoking. 
The key requirement for the instruments is that they are correlated with the 
endogenous variable (smoking prevalence) but do not have a direct effect on the 
dependant variable, cigarette excise tax.  Of the potential instruments, employment status 
and the educational attainment variables have been used in previous cigarette excise tax 
studies, so they can be ruled out as instruments. 
In order to identify which of the potential instruments would be suitable, the 
remaining potential instruments together with the other control variables were all 
regressed against the cigarette excise tax variable and the smoking prevalence variable 
using fixed effects OLS17.  The results of these regressions indicate that the percent of the 
population in good health and the percent of the population who regularly drink were 
                                                 
17 The regression results for the instrument tests are available on request. 
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suitable instruments.  Both were statistically significant in the regression on smoking 
prevalence but statistically insignificant in the regression on cigarette excise tax levels. 
The percent of the population in permanent relationships was not used because it 
was significant in the cigarette tax regression on level, while the percent of the population 
male, and the percent of the population white were also not utilized because they were 
poor predictors for smoking prevalence.  The religion variables were also not utilized due 
to lack of data.  The final set of instruments included the percent of respondents in each 
state indicating they were in good health and the percent of the population that consumed 
alcohol.  Tests for the validity of the instruments are reported in the Results section. 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the model, for 
all states, states with a smoking ban change, and for those states without a smoking ban 
change to illustrate some of the differences between the two sub-samples of states.  The 
smoking ban data used in the introductory analysis was collected from the CDC State 
Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System website, while sales, gasoline, and 
alcohol excise tax rates were obtained from the Tax Foundation’s website. 
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Table 2.1 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate Analysis: Summary Statistics 
 
All States 
States with a 
Ban Change 
States w/o a 
Ban Change 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Smoking Variables    
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 56.2 47.0 63.4 48.5 38.0 37.2 
Smoking Attitude Index 12.6 0.6 12.7 0.5 12.3 0.5 
Smoking Prevalence 22.3 3.3 21.7 3.3 23.7 3.1 
Fiscal Variables    
Minimum Adj. State Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 30.4 31.0 35.5 34.1 17.9 15.4 
Maximum Adj. State Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 82.5 52.6 88.5 54.5 67.5 44.1 
General Fund Ending Balance 8.6 7.1 7.9 6.5 10.1 8.3 
Other Control Variables    
Tobacco Production (Millions of Pounds) 21.8 77.8 5.5 18.1 62.6 134.5 
Conservative Index 51.7 26.7 47.5 27.0 62.4 22.8 
Instruments for Smoking Prevalence    
Percent of Population Reporting Good Health 85.2 3.4 85.6 2.8 84.1 4.3 
Percent of Population which Drinks Alcohol 52.9 10.1 54.1 9.6 49.9 10.8 
N  588  420  168  
 
 
Results 
The parameter estimates for the pooled and fixed effects regressions are presented 
in Table 2.2.  The first two columns contain the results for the smoking ban change states 
and the non-change states are reported in the last two columns.  F-tests of the joint 
significance of the fixed effects indicate the null hypothesis that all of the fixed effects 
are zero can be rejected in both the ban change and non-change states18.  Therefore, the 
                                                 
18 For the states with ban changes, the F-statistic was, F(34, 377) = 3.93, with an associated p-value of 0.00.  
For the states without ban changes, the F-statistic was F(13, 146) = 5.44 and a p-value of 0.00. 
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fixed effects estimates are preferred over the pooled estimates; however, the pooled 
estimates are presented to illustrate the effect of the unobserved heterogeneity between 
states. 
For the smoking related variables, the smoking attitude index variable was 
positive and statistically significant in the pooled specification for the ban change states.  
The coefficient estimate indicates that a one-point increase in the index leads to an 
increase in the state’s cigarette excise tax rate of 20.4 cents.  However, in the fixed 
effects specification, the estimate for the coefficient is 6.2 and is no longer statistically 
significant.  For the non-change states, the smoking ban attitude index variable was not 
statistically significant in either the pooled or fixed effects specification.  In the pooled 
specification the coefficient estimate was 2.7, and in the fixed effects specification it was 
–0.5. 
While the pooled results show that states with higher levels of acceptance for 
smoking bans have higher levels of cigarette excise taxes, once the unobserved 
heterogeneity between states is controlled for with the fixed effects, the estimates become 
inconclusive about the role that attitudes towards smoking bans within states play in 
influencing the level of cigarette taxation.  Even though the estimated coefficient for the 
smoking attitude variable is positive, the standard error is large and the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient is zero cannot be rejected. 
The coefficient estimate for the state smoking prevalence variable was negative, 
small, and not statistically significant in both the pooled and fixed effects specifications 
for the ban change states.  In the states without ban changes, the smoking prevalence 
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variable was negative in both specifications and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level in the pooled regression analysis (estimated coefficient of –1.6), however, it was not 
statistically significant in the fixed effects specification. 
The lagged general-fund ending balance variable coefficient estimate was 
negative and statistically significant in both regressions for the ban change states, while 
in the non-change states the coefficient estimates were small and insignificant.  The 
estimated coefficients in the change states were –0.8 in the pooled regression, and –0.7 in 
the fixed effects regression.  The increase of 0.7 cents for a 1 percent decline in general-
fund ending balances seems small compared to the 25 cents, 50 cents, or 75 cents that 
some states have raised their cigarette taxes.  However, the average increase across all 49 
states was 5.9 cents per year from 1996 to 2007.  Compared to the average of 5.9 cents, 
the 0.7 cents is a much larger percentage increase at almost 12 percent.  The results 
suggest those states that enacted new smoking ban laws were more willing to raise 
cigarette excise taxes in times of fiscal need than those states that did not enact any new 
smoking ban legislation. 
The time trend variables explained much of the increase in cigarette tax rates.  
The pre-MSA time trend variable was not statistically significant in either of the ban 
change states regressions.  For the non-change states, the pooled regression coefficient 
estimate was negative and statistically significant; however, the fixed effects coefficient 
estimate was positive and insignificant.  The post-MSA time trend however was positive 
and statistically significant in all of the regressions, with an estimated coefficient of 2.9 in 
the ban change states and 3.1 in the non-change states.  The statistical significance and 
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large magnitude of the post-MSA time trend indicates that after the Master Settlement 
Agreement was signed, all states increased their cigarette excise tax rates at a much faster 
rate than prior to the signing of the MSA. 
The adjacent state minimum tax rate coefficient was positive in all specifications.  
The estimated coefficient was only significant at the 10 percent level in the ban change 
states pooled specification at 0.2.  For the adjacent state maximum cigarette tax rate 
variable, only the ban change states’ fixed effects estimate was statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficient was –0.1.  The pooled estimate was also negative, but not 
significant.  For the non-change states, both coefficient estimates were not statistically 
significant and small in magnitude. 
These results suggest that states are not influenced by the lowest adjacent state tax 
rate.  However the average change resulting from the trend variable was somewhat 
smaller if the highest adjacent state cigarette tax was changed.  The size of the effect was 
small, at about –0.1 cent per 1 cent of increase in the adjacent state. 
For the other control variables, the tobacco production variable was negative and 
statistically significant in both of the pooled regressions and positive and statistically 
significant in both of the fixed effects specifications, however, the size of the effects was 
small.  In the ban change states, the estimated coefficient from the fixed effects 
regression was 0.4.  A one million pound increase in the production of tobacco would 
lead to an increase in the cigarette excise tax of 0.4 cents.  For the non-change states, the 
estimated coefficient was 0.03. 
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Table 2.2 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate: OLS and Fixed Effects OLS Analysis
Dependant Variable: 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 
  States with Ban Change States w/o Ban Change 
  Specification Specification 
Independent Variables  Pooled Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Effects
Smoking Variables           
Smoking Attitude Index  20.442** 6.175 2.650 -0.500 
se (8.345) (10.067) (6.782) (12.123) 
Smoking Prevalence  -0.432 -0.018 -1.632* -1.049 
  (0.440) (0.474) (0.843) (1.133) 
Fiscal Variables       
Adj. State Min. Cigarette 
Excise Tax Rate 
 0.199* 0.103 0.440 0.049 
  (0.113) (0.106) (0.388) (0.251) 
Adj. State Max Cigarette 
Excise Tax Rate 
 -0.019 -0.091** 0.021 -0.022 
 (0.057) (0.040) (0.108) (0.072) 
Lagged General-fund 
Ending Balance 
 -0.838*** -0.655** -0.069 0.052 
  (0.290) (0.254) (0.262) (0.254) 
Other Control Variables       
Tobacco Production 
(Millions of Pounds) 
 -0.214** 0.388** -0.047* 0.027* 
  (0.081) (0.155) (0.023) (0.013) 
Conservative Ranking 
Index 
 -0.444*** -0.121 -0.166 0.282 
  (0.113) (0.150) (0.131) (0.165) 
Pre-MSA Time Trend  -0.317 0.930 -1.248* -0.426 
  (0.960) (0.943) (0.628) (0.645) 
Post-MSA Time Trend  2.736** 2.850** 3.008* 3.089** 
  (1.341) (1.233) (1.404) (1.194) 
Constant  -55.785* -10.439 16.256 12.128 
  (31.580) (38.355) (26.491) (41.154) 
r2   0.359 0.327 0.262 0.257 
F   12.4 11.0 9.2 5.6 
N   420 420 168 168 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates in the fixed effects 
regressions were unexpected.  For the ban change states, the positive coefficient can be 
explained by the fact that overall tobacco production increased from less than one million 
pounds in 1996 to over 7 million pounds in 2007 at the same time that cigarette excise 
taxes increased.  For the states without ban changes, even though overall tobacco 
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production decreased, three states increased their cigarette excise tax rates at the same 
time tobacco production increased.  North Carolina and Pennsylvania both increased their 
cigarette taxes in years in which tobacco production also increased, while Wisconsin 
increased its cigarette excise tax twice at the same time that tobacco production 
increased. 
The conservative ranking index variable was negative in both of the ban change 
states regressions, but only statistically significant in the pooled regression.  For the non-
change states, the pooled regression coefficient estimate was negative while the fixed 
effects estimate was positive.  Neither was statistically significant. 
To check the sensitivity of the results to the interpolation of the smoking attitude 
variable, the regression equations were re-estimated dropping the interpolated 
observations for the smoking attitude index variable.19.  Because only one of the years of 
remaining data was from prior to the MSA, the pre-MSA variable was dropped.  The 
results are similar both with and without the observations in the model.  The largest 
difference is that the post-MSA time trend is no longer statistically significant in the non-
ban change states.  The lagged general fund ending balances and post-MSA time trend 
variables retain the same signs and are both statistically significant for the ban change 
states.  A table with the results is presented in Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
19 Only five years of observations remain in the data set due to the serial correlation adjustment 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2003, and 2007. 
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Instrumental Variables Results 
To determine if the smoking prevalence variable was endogenous, instrumental 
variables were used to re-estimate the fixed effects models, treating smoking prevalence 
as endogenous.  Instruments used were the percent of the state’s population reporting 
being in good health and the state’s drinking prevalence.  Results for the fixed effects 
instrumental variable estimation for the cigarette tax rate level model are presented in 
Table 2.3.   
To estimate the IV regressions, the xtivreg2 command in STATA was used.  The 
estimation technique chosen was the Continuously Updated GMM Estimator (CUE-
GMM) because the CUE performs better in the presence of weak instruments and is 
robust to heteroskedasticity (Hahn et. al., 2004). 
Drinking prevalence data were missing for the years of 1996, 1998, and 2000.  
Because of the missing data, the serial correlation adjustment can only be made for the 
drinking prevalence variable for the years of 2002 through 2007.  As such, the IV 
analysis was conducted using only the 2002 through 2007 data and the pre-MSA time 
trend variable was omitted from the analysis.  The fixed effects regressions from Table 
2.2 were re-estimated using only these years so that the results from the fixed effects for 
the full sample, fixed effects for the restricted sample, and IV fixed effects for the 
restricted sample can be compared. 
For the fixed effects regressions, dropping the pre-2002 years of data did change 
the coefficient estimates and the statistical significance of several of the variables. The 
changes occurred for tobacco production, the political conservativism index, and the 
33 
post-MSA time trend.  The tobacco production variable became insignificant in both the 
ban change states and non-change states regressions, the political conservativism index in 
the non-change states became statistically significant, and the post-MSA time trend 
coefficient in the non-change states also became non-significant.  Overall, the loss of the 
pre-2002 data did not change the analysis.  
Several tests were conducted to validate the instruments used.  First, a test for 
identification of the model was conducted.  The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) statistic was used to test for identification.  Under the null for the test, 
the equation is under identified.  The test statistics for the ban changes states was: chi2(2) 
= 7.84, with a p-value of 0.019, and for the non-change states it was: chi2(2) = 5.39, with 
an associated p-value of =0.068.  The test rejects the null of under identification for the 
ban changes states at the 5 percent level, but only rejects the null at the 10 percent 
confidence level for the non-change states. 
A test of the significance of the endogenous regression variables in the structural 
equation can be tested using the Anderson–Rubin (AR) Wald test and Stock–Wright 
(SW) LM tests.   The AR test has both chi2 and F-test versions.  Both the AR and SW 
tests are tests of the null hypotheses that the endogenous regressors are irrelevant (β=0) 
and there are appropriate over identifying restrictions.  For the ban change states, all three 
of the tests failed to reject the null, with test statistics of: AR Wald F-test, F(2,34) = 0.03, 
AR Wald chi2 test, chi2(2) = 0.07, and SW LM test, chi2(2) = 0.06.  The test statistics for 
the non-change states were: AR Wald F-test, F(2,13) = 3.07 with a p-value of 0.081, AR 
Wald chi2 test, chi2(2) = 7.32 with a p-value of 0.026, and SW LM test, chi2(2) = 4.19 
34 
with a p-value of 0.123.  While all three of the tests failed to reject the null hypothesis for 
the ban change states, only one of the tests failed to reject the null for the non-change 
states.  These results indicate that either smoking prevalence was not endogenous in ban 
change states but was endogenous in the non-change states or the model was under 
identified in the non-change states, which was suggested by the test for model 
identification. 
The correlation of the instruments with the error term in the equation of interest 
was tested using the Hansen’s J statistic.  The J test is appropriate when the data is 
heteroskedastic.  The null of the test is that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated 
with the error term.  In both specifications, the test failed to reject the null. For the change 
states, the test statistic was: chi2(1) = 0.06, with a p-value of 0.801.  For the non-change 
states, the test statistic was chi2(1) = 2.12, with a p-value of 0.146.  
Finally, the endogeneity of the smoking prevalence variable was tested.  Using the 
-endog- option within the xtivreg2 command, the null for the test is that the suspected 
endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous.  The endogeneity test implemented by 
xtivreg2 is the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics.  The first statistic comes from 
an equation where the variable in question is treated as endogenous and the second 
statistic comes from an equation where the variable is treated as exogenous.  In both 
cases, the test failed to reject the null.  For the change states the test statistic was: chi2(1) 
= 0.04 and a p-value of 0.844.  The non-change states test statistic was: chi2(1) = 1.24 
with a p-value of 0.266. 
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Table 2.3 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate: Instrumental Variables Analysis 
Dependant Variable: 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 
  States with Ban Change States w/o Ban Change 
  Specification Specification 
Independent Variables   Fixed 
Effects 
96-07 
Fixed 
Effects 
02-07 
IV Fixed 
Effects 
02-07 
Fixed 
Effects 
96-07 
Fixed 
Effects 
02-07 
IV Fixed 
Effects 
02-07 
Smoking Variables               
Smoking Attitude Index  6.175 2.739 2.007 -0.500 6.907 9.420 
se (10.067) (11.252) (10.250) (12.123) (23.149) (19.406) 
Smoking Prevalence   -0.018 0.631 -0.127 -1.049 -0.274 8.039 
  (0.474) (0.908) (4.044) (1.133) (2.422) (6.539) 
Fiscal Variables         
Adj. State Min. Cigarette 
Excise Tax Rate 
  0.103 -0.052 -0.050 0.049 -0.146 -0.284 
  (0.106) (0.114) (0.116) (0.251) (0.178) (0.267) 
Adj. State Max Cigarette 
Excise Tax Rat 
  -0.091** -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.022 -0.046 -0.077 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.072) (0.077) (0.070) 
Lagged General-fund 
Ending Balance 
  -0.655** -0.809** -0.778** 0.052 0.199 0.456 
  (0.254) -0.318 -0.364 -0.254 -0.348 -0.412 
Other Control Variables         
Tobacco Production 
(Millions of Pounds) 
  0.388** -0.206 -0.241 0.027* 0.009 0.025 
  (0.155) (0.332) (0.356) (0.013) (0.096) (0.054) 
Conservative Ranking 
Index 
  -0.121 -0.202 -0.170 0.282 0.613** 0.484* 
  (0.150) (0.235) (0.241) (0.165) (0.281) (0.250) 
Pre-MSA Time Trend   0.930   -0.426   
  (0.943)   (0.645)   
Post-MSA Time Trend   2.850** 4.399*** 4.228*** 3.089** 3.593 5.152* 
  (1.233) (0.824) (1.004) (1.194) (2.164) (3.000) 
Constant   -10.439 8.581  12.128 -34.204  
  (38.355) (46.192)  (41.154) (89.184)  
r2   0.327 0.124 0.122 0.257 0.148 -0.091 
F  11.0 5.022 5.356 5.59 1.975 1.157 
N  420 210 210 168 84 84 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01        
 
 
The results of the instrumental variables regressions did not differ substantially 
from the main results.  The coefficient on the lagged general fund ending balances 
variables was still negative and statistically significant in the ban changes states, and the 
post-MSA time trend variable coefficient was positive and statistically significant in both 
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the ban change and non-ban change states.  Because the main results remain the same, the 
smoking prevalence was found to be exogenous in the ban changes states, and the 
instrumental variables results for the non-change states are uncertain, the fixed effects 
results remain the preferred specification.  
 
Discussion and Summary 
This analysis has examined the role that attitudes towards smoking bans, fiscal 
conditions, and other variables play in the determination of the level of cigarette taxation.  
The results indicate that once unobserved heterogeneity between states is controlled for, 
anti-smoking sentiment as measured by attitudes towards smoking bans was not an 
important determinant in the level of cigarette taxation. 
However, to the extent that attitudes towards smoking bans help determine 
changes in smoking ban legislation, attitudes matter because states that have enacted new 
smoking ban legislation were more likely to raise their cigarette excise rate during 
periods of fiscal need.  The cigarette tax rate in states that have not enacted new smoking 
ban legislation was unaffected by changes in general fund ending balances.  It should be 
noted that the non-change states had higher average general fund ending balances and so 
may never have dropped below some ending balance critical threshold, which would 
have caused them to look at raising their cigarette tax rates. 
By far the largest impact on cigarette tax rates appears to be the Master Settlement 
Agreement.  The results show that cigarette excise taxes increased across all states, ban 
change and non-change, after the states and major tobacco companies entered into the 
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Master Settlement Agreement.  Trogden and Sloan found a one-time 10-cent increase in 
cigarette taxes in 1998 and then a 3 period of flat taxes.  While the overall average 
change in cigarette excise tax rates was 5.9 cents per year, in the non-ban change states 
the average was only 3.9 cents per year versus 6.7 in the change states.  This analysis 
shows however that in the non-change states, the post-MSA time trend accounted for 3.1 
of the 3.9 cents of annual increase, compared to 2.9 cents of the 6.7 cents of annual 
increase in the ban change states.  As Trogden and Sloan suggested, it appears that the 
states took advantage of the political weakness of the tobacco companies after the MSA 
to increase cigarette taxes across the board. 
While advocacy groups have urged state legislatures to raise cigarette taxes to 
reduce the prevalence of smoking, it appears that their pleas have “fallen on deaf ears” in 
the majority of states.  While cigarette excise taxes have indeed risen substantially, with 
the possible exception of the few states that raised their tax rates $1.00 or more, the 
driving forces behind the increases have been the fiscal needs of some of the states and an 
overall acceptance of increased cigarette excise taxes after the Master Settlement 
Agreement. 
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Appendix A: Smoking Ban Attitude Index Calculation 
Attitudes towards smoking bans are probed in most waves of the CPS-TUS.  The 
CPS-TUS data was available for all years except 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005.  A 
linear extrapolation from the available years was used to estimate the smoking attitude 
index for the missing years.  
Questions about attitudes towards smoking bans in restaurants, work areas, bars, 
and indoor sporting events are consistently asked.  Possible answers to the questions are: 
“1-Allowed in all areas”, “2-Allowed in some areas”, or “3-Not allowed at all”. 
In addition, the respondent’s home smoking policy is also probed, with the 
following responses: “1-No one is allowed to smoke anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”, 
“2-Smoking is allowed in some places or at some time INSIDE YOUR HOME”, “3-
Smoking is permitted anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”. 
To construct the index, first the home smoking policy variable was recoded so 
that higher values reflected stronger anti-smoking sentiment: “1-Smoking is permitted 
anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”, “2-Smoking is allowed in some places or at some 
time INSIDE YOUR HOME”, and “3-No one is allowed to smoke anywhere INSIDE 
YOUR HOME”. 
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The individual responses were summed, then averaged by state and year to derive 
a state attitude index for each year.  The formula is to calculate an individual’s attitude 
index is as follows: 
Smoking Attitude Index  =  Restaurant Attitude + Work Area Attitude 
+ Bar Attitude + Indoor Sporting Events Attitude 
+ (4-Home Smoking Policy) 
To test if these five questions measure the same idea, attitude towards smoking, 
Cronbach's alpha (reliability coefficient) was calculated.  The reliability coefficient was 
0.76, indicating that the 5 items all measured the same underlying attitude of the 
respondent.  
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Appendix B: Results without Interpolation of Smoking Ban Attitude Index 
 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate OLS and Fixed Effects OLS Analysis
Without Interpolation of Smoking Ban Attitude Index Variable 
Dependant Variable: 
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 
  States with Ban Change States w/o Ban Change 
  Specification Specification 
Independent Variables  Pooled Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Effects
Smoking Variables           
Smoking Attitude Index  7.270 -6.654 1.838 -4.188 
se (0.106) (0.094) (0.113) (0.132) 
Smoking Prevalence  -2.054** -1.415 -1.424 -0.217 
  (0.894) (1.241) (0.929) (1.630) 
Fiscal Variables       
Adj. State Min. Cigarette 
Excise Tax Rate 
 0.115 0.038 0.445 0.092 
  (0.131) (0.097) (0.470) (0.392) 
Adj. State Max Cigarette 
Excise Tax Rate 
 -0.065 -0.173* 0.146 0.132 
 (0.411) (0.422) (0.473) (0.376) 
Lagged General-fund 
Ending Balance 
 -1.153*** -0.893** 0.078 -0.129 
  (9.400) (12.385) (9.262) (23.219) 
Other Control Variables       
Tobacco Production 
(Millions of Pounds) 
 -0.287** 0.311 -0.048 0.042 
  (0.121) (0.200) (0.041) (0.043) 
Conservative Ranking 
Index 
 -0.404** -0.017 0.010 0.199 
  (0.171) (0.246) (0.211) (0.320) 
Pre-MSA Time Trend  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post-MSA Time Trend  2.864*** 4.962*** 1.032 2.238 
  (0.909) (1.009) (1.431) (2.005) 
Constant  11.979 56.979 9.594 18.826 
  (39.851) (53.739) (31.581) (80.320) 
r2   0.341 0.356 0.281 0.269 
F   10.7 6.2 8.2 2.8 
N   175 175 70 70 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
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CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECT OF COMPLETE SMOKING BANS IN BARS AND RESTAURANTS 
ON SMOKING PREVALENCE AND INTENSITY 
 
Introduction 
In 1995 Utah completely banned smoking in restaurants and in 1998 California 
completely banned smoking in restaurants and bars.  No additional statewide complete 
smoking bans were enacted until 2002 when South Dakota completely banned smoking 
in workplaces, and Delaware completely banned smoking in workplaces, restaurants, and 
bars.  Since 2002, the number of complete workplace, restaurant and bar smoking bans 
has increased significantly.  By January 1, 2009, 22 states completely banned smoking in 
private workplaces, 28 states completely banned smoking in restaurants, and 22 states 
completely banned smoking in bars20. 
Numerous studies have investigated the effect of individual worksite smoking 
bans on the prevalence and intensity of cigarette use.  The research has shown that bans 
enacted at worksites were effective in reducing both the prevalence and intensity of 
smoking.  The effectiveness of worksite bans was attributed to the large amount of time 
that individuals spend in their workplaces (Evans et al., 1999).  Studies further indicated 
                                                 
20 The District of Columbia, which banned smoking in workplaces on April 3, 2006 and in restaurants and 
bars on January 1, 2007, is not counted in these totals. 
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that the effect of the bans increased the longer the workweek and the more restrictive the 
smoking ban. 
But what effect has the recent increase in complete statewide smoking bans in 
restaurants and bars had on smoking prevalence and intensity?  Because individuals 
spend significantly less time at restaurants and bars than they do at their worksites and 
can choose not to frequent restaurants and bars, the effect of the bans should presumably 
be smaller.  However, because dining out and frequenting bars is a recreational activity, 
the desire to participate in these activities may outweigh the negative impacts of the bans 
for smokers, and they may choose to refrain from smoking to dine out and visit bars. 
Using the Current Population Survey – Tobacco Use Supplements conducted 
from 1995 through 2007, this paper will examine the effect of the recent increase in the 
number of complete worksite, restaurant, and bar smoking bans.  Subsequent sections of 
this paper include a brief literature review, a description of the methodology employed, a 
discussion of the data used, the results, and finally a discussion and summary.   
The results suggest that complete smoking bans have little effect on smoking 
prevalence and have a mixed effect on smoking intensity.  The essay also explores the 
effect that explicitly accounting for attitudes towards smoking bans through the addition 
of a smoking ban attitude index variable has on these results.  The smoking ban attitude 
index variable will be used to control for the presence of sub-state smoking bans.  The 
inclusion of the smoking ban attitude variable was found to have little effect on the 
estimated coefficients for the smoking ban variables, but it reduced the effect of the price 
of cigarettes on smoking participation and intensity of consumption.  Finally, the essay 
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finds that smoking bans in bars and higher alcohol prices may be effective at reducing the 
consumption of cigarettes. 
This essay contributes to the literature on smoking by examining the effect that 
complete smoking bans in social settings, bars and restaurants, has on smoking 
prevalence and intensity.  It also shows that including a measure of attitudes toward 
smoking bans in the analysis reduces the effect that the price of cigarettes has on smoking 
prevalence and intensity. 
 
Relevant Literature 
Recent summaries of the effect of smoking bans on smoking can be found in 
Fichtenberg and Glantz (2002), Levy and Friend (2003), and Goel and Nelson (2006).  
Fichtenberg and Glantz reviewed 26 studies that looked at private worksites that had 
enacted smoking restrictions.  Fichtenberg and Glantzs’ main conclusion was that 
worksite bans reduced smoking prevalence by 3.8 percentage points and the average 
number of cigarettes smoked by 1.3 cigarettes.  They also found that total bans were 
about twice as effective in reducing the prevalence of smoking as partial bans.  The 
studies reviewed used survey data from the 1980’s and early 1990’s.   
The review by Levy and Friend not only looked at worksite studies but also 
reviewed 18 studies that examined public clean air legislation.  Their review of the 
worksite studies reached similar conclusions as the Fichtenberg and Glantz study.  Levy 
and Friend found that extensive clean air laws were associated with lower smoking 
prevalence and cigarette consumption.  Overall, they found that the presence of smoking 
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restrictions reduced the prevalence of smoking by 5 to 20 percent.  However, all but one 
of the studies they examined used legislation enacted prior to 1994 when total bans were 
rare.    Finally, Goel and Nelson reviewed 5 U.S. and 5 international studies of smoking 
control measures that used data primarily from the mid 1970s through the mid 1990s.  
They concluded, “territorial restrictions were effective in reducing smoking in most 
cases, and in only one case did we find the territorial restrictions to be ineffective” (pg. 
340). 
While the summary papers referenced above show that smoking bans are effective 
at reducing the prevalence and intensity of smoking, several individual studies are worth 
noting.  Studies by Chaloupka (1992), Farelly et al. (1999), and Czart et al. (2001)21 show 
that increased numbers of weak smoking bans alone will not decrease cigarette 
consumption, rather it is the severity of the smoking bans that matters. 
The study by Chaloupka (1992) used the Second National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey data set and statewide smoking bans.  The study found that “the 
passage of a clean indoor air law does have a negative impact on average cigarette 
consumption.  However, the results suggest that increasing the restrictiveness of these 
laws, beyond some ‘basic’ level, does not appear to have a greater impact on cigarette 
consumption” (pg. 202).   It is important be note that the definition of a “basic” level of 
smoking bans indicates the state regulated public smoking in four or more public places 
but does not include restaurants or private worksites.  In contrast states’ with “extensive” 
                                                 
21 Both the Chaloupka and Farelly et al. studies are included in the Levy and Friend review, while the 
Fictenberg and Glantz review included the Farelly et al. study.  The Czart et al. study was included in the 
review by Goel and Nelson. 
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bans also regulated the use of cigarettes in restaurants and private worksites, however, 
these were not complete smoking bans.   
During the time frame referenced in Chaloupka’s study, the smoking restrictions 
only consisted of designated smoking areas.  In effect, the study showed that once a state 
adopted some limited smoking restrictions, expansion of those limited smoking 
restrictions to other public places did not further reduce cigarette consumption.  Given the 
definition of the basic and extensive smoking ban variables, it may be that the smoking 
ban variables were detecting the effect of some unobserved variable such as “social 
attitudes” towards smoking. 
Subsequently the Farelly et al. (1999) study used the Current Population Study – 
Tobacco Use Supplements (CPS-TUS) data from 1992 and 1993 and examined self-
reported workplace smoking bans.  A change from no smoking bans in the workplace to a 
complete smoking ban was estimated to reduce smoking prevalence by 5.7 percentage 
points and average daily consumption by 14 percent.  When smoking was allowed in 
common areas, the effect of the workplace bans was reduced by roughly half.  Prevalence 
was lowered by only 2.6 percentage points, and average daily consumption decreased by 
only 8 percent when smoking was allowed in common areas.  Partial workplace bans had 
no effect on smoking prevalence, but decreased average daily consumption by roughly 3 
percent. 
Finally the Czart et al. (2001) study found that “campus prohibitions on smoking 
in all areas have a negative and marginally significant association with the level of 
smoking among current smokers relative to other types of restrictions but have no 
46 
significant impact on smoking participation. Only complete bans influence smoking 
behavior” (pg. 146).   
To summarize the three studies, the study by Chaloupka suggests that extending 
less restrictive smoking bans to more locations will not reduce the consumption of 
cigarettes.  The study by Farelly et al. suggests that more stringent smoking bans did 
reduce cigarette consumption.  The Czart et al. paper similarly suggested that more 
stringent bans reduce cigarette consumption. 
While the above studies have shown the effectiveness of smoking bans at 
reducing smoking prevalence and intensity, they did not account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, such as smoking sentiment, in their analysis.  More recent work recognizes 
that unobserved heterogeneity like smoking sentiment, poses another complication when 
examining smoking bans it could influence both smoking behavior and tobacco policy.  
Tauras (2006) found that once state level unobserved heterogeneity was controlled for, 
the effect of smoking bans on smoking prevalence largely disappeared.  However, 
smoking bans were still effective at reducing the number of cigarettes smoked.  Tauras 
used the 1992-1993, 1995-1996, and 1998-1999 CPS-TUS and utilized 5 different types 
of statewide smoking bans measured on a continuous scale.  The bans were examined 
both individually and aggregated into a smoking ban index, while unobserved 
heterogeneity was controlled for by using state effects. 
While smoking bans were ineffective in reducing the incidence of smoking, they 
were effective in reducing average daily consumption.  Price, however, had a statistically 
significant impact on both smoking prevalence and intensity.  Based on the results, 
47 
Tauras concluded that price might be a more effective tool to reduce smoking prevalence 
than smoking bans. 
While Tauras used state effects to capture the effect of smoking sentiment and 
other unobserved heterogeneity that might influence an individual’s decision to smoke, 
this paper adds two additional covariates that attempt to control for attitudes towards 
smoking and smoking bans more directly.  The two measures a smoking ban attitude 
index and the smoking prevalence rate within the state.  The smoking ban attitude index 
variable will help control for the presence of sub-state bans, because states with more 
positive attitudes towards smoking bans are more likely to have more numerous sub-state 
smoking bans.  The smoking prevalence variable will help control for other aspects of the 
smoking environment. 
Building on the smoking literature, this paper adds the understanding of the 
effects of complete smoking bans.  The essay finds that complete restaurant smoking 
bans increased the number of cigarettes smoked.  Two possible explanations for the 
increase are suggested.  Additionally, the paper finds that complete smoking bans in bars 
and higher alcohol prices reduced the consumption of cigarettes. 
 
Modeling Framework 
To model the demand for cigarettes, the standard utility maximization problem 
will be expanded to include smoking bans.  Consumers maximize utility by consuming a 
good until the marginal cost of the good is equal to the marginal benefit of the good.  The 
simplest models include income, price, and the prices of substitutes and compliments.   
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To help control for individual preferences when performing regression analysis, a 
vector of demographic characteristics is typically included.  For this analysis, additional 
smoking related variables were added to the regression equation estimated.  The main 
variables of interest, smoking bans, were included in the regression to control for the 
effect that the bans have on the consumption of cigarettes.  Additional variables related to 
smoking included in the model are described in the data section. 
Complete smoking bans prevent smokers from consuming cigarettes while they 
are in the establishment subject to the smoking ban by making smoking inconvenient by 
forcing smokers to an outside smoking area.  Smoking bans “…reduce the smoker's 
opportunities to smoke or otherwise raise the "cost" of smoking” (Chaloupka, Frank J. 
and Warner, Kenneth E, 2000, pg. 1596). 
For private workplace bans, individuals have few options to reduce the impact of 
the ban because most individuals need to work and all workplaces are subject to the ban.  
For the restaurant and bar smoking bans, individuals have more choice.  While the 
smoking ban reduces the utility that smokers derive from dining out and drinking by 
preventing them from smoking while eating and drinking, individuals can choose to 
refrain from dining out by eating home cooked meals or consuming “take out” and by 
drinking alcohol at home.  For smoking bans in restaurants and bars to reduce the 
consumption of cigarettes, the additional utility derived from dining out and drinking at 
bars must be greater than the loss of utility from not smoking in these establishments.   
Empirically, when looking at the data on cigarette consumption, a large number of 
consumers choose not to consume cigarettes, thus consumption is equal to zero.  This 
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leads to a cumulative distribution of cigarette consumption that has a mass point at zero 
representing individuals who choose not smoke and a continuous distribution 
representing the number of cigarettes smoked by those who choose to smoke. 
Such mixed distributions are typically modeled in two parts22.  First, for the 
participation decision, a probit or logit procedure is used to model the dichotomous 
decision to smoke or not to smoke.  Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) or a 
generalized linear method (GLM) is used to estimate the intensity or quantity of 
cigarettes consumed, conditional on the individual first choosing to smoke. 
If OLS is used for the second part of the model, the log of the number of 
cigarettes can be used in order to more closely approximate the normal distribution as the 
distribution of the number of cigarettes consumed tends to be skewed.  However this 
leads to retransformation problems to return coefficients to the raw scale (Duan, 1983; 
Mullahy, 1998; Manning, 1998; and Manning and Mullahy, 2001). 
As opposed to using OLS with the log of the dependant variable, a generalized 
linear model can also be employed.  The advantage of using a GLM model is that GLM 
models directly estimate ln{E[Y | X]}, compared to OLS with a transformed dependant 
variable that estimates E[ln(Y) | X] and requires retransforming.  Unlike traditional linear 
models, a GLM model allows for the expected value of the response variable to depend 
on a linear predictor through a nonlinear link function and allows the response probability 
distribution to be one of the distributions from the exponential family. 
                                                 
22 For example: Chaloupka and Groosman (1996); Farrelly, Evans and Sfekas (1999); Czart, Pacula, 
Chaloupka, and Wechsler (2001); Tauras (2004); and Tauras (2006). 
50 
For the participation decision a probit model was chosen: 
(3.1) Pr(zcig > 0 | P, w, SV, X) = Φ(α + δP + ηw + βSV + λX) 
where: zcig > 0 is measured as someone who has smoked in the past 30 days; P 
(prices of cigarettes, compliments and substitutes), w (income),  SV (smoking ban and 
other smoking related variables), and X (vector of demographic demand shifters) are 
vectors of explanatory variables; α, δ, η, λ, and β are coefficients to be estimated; and Φ 
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
To model the conditional demand, a Modified Park Test of the data with positive 
consumption of cigarettes was conducted.  The test indicated that the raw scale variance 
was linearly related to the mean suggesting that a Poisson distribution for the data.  
Because the data showed a Poisson distribution, a Zero Truncated Poisson model was 
estimated: 
(3.2) g[E(zcig)] = τ + κP + γw + ωX + νSV,  zcig ~ Poisson and zcig > 0 
where zcig represents the average number of cigarettes smoked in the past month 
conditional on cigarette consumption being positive, τ, κ, γ, ω, and ν are parameters to be 
estimated, and g [.] is a log-link function.  The remaining variables are defined as above.  
Robust standard errors were calculated with clustering at the state level.  Clustering at the 
state level relaxes the assumptions of independence of observations so that observations 
only have to be independent across states but not within states.  Additionally, all 
regression equations included probability weights.  
Both the smoking participation and intensity equations were estimated with and 
without the state smoking ban attitude index variable to assess the impact of adding this 
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variable on the results.  In addition, because of the potential multicollinearity between the 
smoking ban variables, the participation and intensity equations were also estimated 
using a variable of smoking ban prevalence and severity.  The regressions with the 
smoking ban index were also estimated with and without the state smoking ban attitude 
index variable.  In total, eight regressions were run, four regressions for the participation 
equation and four regressions for the intensity equation. 
 
Data 
This study used data from a variety of sources that are described below.  Only the 
two dependant variables and key independent variables are described in depth.  For the 
smoking participation regression, the dependant variable was whether the individual 
smoked in past 30 days.  The dependant variable for the intensity of consumption 
regression was the average number of cigarettes smoked per month.   
The data sources for the variables used in this study include the Current 
Population Survey – Tobacco Use Supplements (CPS-TUS), ImpacTeen’s Tobacco 
Control Policy and Prevalence Data23, the publication “The Tax Burden on Tobacco – 
2008,” the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW), and the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
Both of the dependant variables, smoking status and number of cigarettes smoked, 
come from the CPS-TUS, as well as demographic characteristics of the individual.  The 
Census Bureau conducts the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly for the Bureau of 
                                                 
23 The ImpactTeen tobacco control data can be found at: http://www.impacteen.org/tobaccodata.htm. 
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Labor Statistics.  Roughly 57,000 households are surveyed each month.  The main 
purpose of the CPS is to collect information on the employment status of those surveyed, 
however, in conjunction with the surveyed household’s employment situation, 
demographic information such as age, sex, race, marital status, educational attainment, 
and family income is also collected24.   
Occasionally, the Census Bureau asks supplemental questions about additional 
topics, including tobacco consumption in the Tobacco Use Supplement.  The tobacco 
consumption questions in the TUS include current smoking status, if the individual has 
smoked 100 or more cigarettes in their lifetime, and average number of cigarettes smoked 
per day.  Additionally, questions about household and workplace smoking policies and 
attitudes towards smoking bans are also asked.  The 1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2000, 2001-
2002, 2003, and 2006-2007 waves of the CPS-TUS were used25. 
While the CPS/TUS asked about average daily consumption, this measure was 
converted to average number of cigarettes smoked per month.  The change ensures 
comparability between the number of cigarettes smoked by occasional smokers and 
everyday smokers.  For everyday smokers, the average number of cigarettes smoked was 
calculated as the average daily number of cigarettes smoked times 30, while for 
occasional smokers the monthly average was calculated as the number of days smoked in 
the past 30 times the average number of cigarettes smoked on those days.  Although self-
                                                 
24 Detailed information about the demographic variables from the CPS is provided in Appendix B. 
25  Response rates for the 2006 and 2007 TUS were between 81-85 percent for self-and-proxy responses 
and 60-64 percent for self-response only, compared to roughly 91 percent for the basic monthly survey.  
Current Population Survey, January 2007: Tobacco Use Supplement File Technical Documentation CPS—
07 
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reported smoking status questions are potentially subject to bias, studies by Vogt et al. 
(1977), Wagenknecht et al. (1992), Glynn et al. (1986), and Klesges et al. (1992), have 
shown that self-reported smoking status is reliable, with biochemical measures of 
smoking status agreeing with self-report status 85% to 95% of the time.   
One final variable derived from the CPS-TUS was a smoking ban attitude index 
variable.  DeCicca, et al. (2006), examined nine different measures of attitudes towards 
smoking bans, restrictions on tobacco advertising, and home smoking policies from the 
TUS, and found that all nine were derived from a common factor that they labeled “anti-
smoking sentiment.” Using the nine measures, they constructed an attitudes toward 
smoking index.  Because all nine questions were not asked in the more recent TUSs, the 
smoking ban attitude index was created by using the four available questions about 
attitudes towards smoking bans and the home smoking policy question26.    The smoking 
ban attitude index variable should help control for the presence of less than statewide 
smoking bans because states with more positive attitudes about smoking bans should be 
more likely to have more numerous and more severe local smoking bans. 
Smoking ban data was obtained from the ImpactTeen Program’s website. The 
ImpactTeen data included both complete and less restrictive (weak) smoking bans in 
force during the calendar year.  The main reason for the use of the ImpactTeen data was 
to include both complete and weak smoking bans in the analysis.  The ImapctTeen data 
rated the severity of smoking bans on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 indicating no restrictions, a 
3 indicating a complete ban, with 1 or 2 indicating a weaker form of ban such as separate 
                                                 
26 Compete details about the construction of the state attitude index are given in Appendix A. 
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smoking areas without airflow separation or separately ventilated rooms.  For each 
location type of ban, workplace, restaurant, or bar, two dummy variables were 
constructed, an absolute ban indicator and a weak ban indicator.     
Because the inclusion of multiple types of similar smoking bans could lead to 
colliniarity problems, a weighted index of smoking bans to measure the overall severity 
of smoking restrictions within each state was also utilized.  Adding the raw scale 
rankings for each type of ban created a weighted index of the prevalence and severity of 
the smoking bans.  The weighted index has a minimum possible value of 0, representing 
no bans of any kind for private workplaces, restaurants, or bars, to a possible maximum 
of 9, representing complete bans in all three. 
Also from the ImpactTeen data, a dummy variable for the minimum age of 
purchase for cigarettes was constructed.  The majority of states have set the minimum age 
for purchase of tobacco products at 18 years of age; however, four states restrict the 
purchase of tobacco to individuals 19 and older27.   
Price data for cigarettes was obtained from the publication, “The Tax Burden on 
Tobacco, 2008.”  Prices represented the average price for a pack of 20 cigarettes, 
including generic brands, inclusive of state and federal excise taxes on November 1 of 
each year.  To match prices more closely to the date of the CPS interview, monthly price 
data was calculated as a linear extrapolation between each November 1st price.  
                                                 
27 Synar Amendment (Section 1926 of Title XIX of the Federal Public Health Service Act), passed in 1992 
by Congress, places the responsibility of age limits on tobacco purchases on the states.  Requires all 50 
states and the District of Colombia to have and enforce laws that prohibit sales of tobacco to individuals 
less than 18 years of age.  Only four states have an age requirement of 19 years, Alabama (1997), Alaska 
(2007), NJ (2006), and Utah (1998). 
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Smoking prevalence rates for each state were taken from the BRFSS.  The BRFSS 
is a national health survey conducted annually by all of the States in conjunction with the 
Centers for Disease Control.  The survey collects information on health risk behaviors, 
health practices, health care access and general demographics about the respondents28. 
The prices of restaurant meals and of alcohol at a bar were included because these 
goods are potential substitutes or compliments of smoking.  Because price data for 
restaurant meals and for alcohol at a bar were not available, wage data from the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
was used to generate price proxy variables.  The average annual wage for Full Service 
Restaurants and for Drinking places (alcoholic beverages)29 was utilized as a proxy for 
the price of restaurant meals and alcohol at a bar.  
Average annual pay should provide a reasonable proxy for restaurant meal and 
alcohol at a bar prices.  According to the National Restaurant Association, labor 
represented one-third of the total costs in restaurants30.  Further, examining payroll and 
operating expenses from the 2007 Economic Census conducted by the Census Bureau, 
the ratio of payroll to expenses for combined Food services and drinking places sector 
was 0.448, showing that payroll represented roughly have of the expenses for the sector. 
Several studies have found a correlation between the prices and wages, although 
the direction of the causation was mixed in the studies.  Pu, Flaschel, and Chihying 
                                                 
28  The survey includes all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  In  2006, more than 350,000 adults were 
interviewed by phone. 
29 NAICS Codes: 7221 – Full Service Restaurants, 7224 Drinking places (alcoholic beverages). 
30 National Restaurant Association, Restaurant Industry Operations Report, 2003 
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(2006) found that price inflation caused wage inflation in the United States’ economy, 
while Ghali (1999) finds that the process ran from wages to prices.  Aaronson (2001) 
looked specifically at the restaurant industries in the U.S. and Canada and also found that 
prices rose with wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1994) determined that restaurants in 
New Jersey raised prices sufficiently to cover the cost of an increase in the minimum 
wage.   Even though the direction of the causation was not certain, this also suggests that 
though imperfect, average annual pay is a reasonable proxy for prices at restaurants and 
for alcohol at bars, and should capture some of the variability in prices for these goods 
across time and states. 
The Consumer Price Index – all urban consumers (CPI-U) all items index from 
the BLS was used to deflate all of the monetary measures into real dollars.  The smoking 
prevalence, state smoking ban attitude index, purchase restrictions, price of cigarettes, the 
price of dining out, and the price of alcohol at bars were all treated as exogenous in the 
model because the actions and attitudes of any single individual are small in magnitude 
and unlikely to change these state level variables.  In addition, all model specifications 
included state dummy variables to account for any time persistent unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Some descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table 3.1.  For the smoking 
participation regression, there were a total of 782,846 observations.  For the intensity of 
consumption regression, there were 160,253 observations that reported positive numbers 
of cigarettes smoked. 
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Table 3.1 
Smoking Prevalence and Intensity Analysis: Summary Statistics 
  All Individuals Non-Smokers Smokers 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Smoking Related Variables             
Smoking Status 0.206 0.404 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Average Number of Cigarettes  
Smoked per Month 
97.1 242.9 0.0 0.0 472.3 331.5 
State Smoking Prevalence 0.223 0.033 0.222 0.033 0.228 0.032 
Age 19 Purchase Restriction 0.029 0.166 0.030 0.171 0.022 0.148 
State Smoking Ban Attitude Index 12.6 0.6 12.6 0.6 12.5 0.6 
Real Price Of Cigarettes  1.74 0.45 1.75 0.45 1.70 0.44 
Price of Dining Out 7,061 1,239 7,086 1,240 6,962 1,230 
Price of Alcohol at Bars 6,099 995 6,114 998 6,043 982 
Smoking Ban Variables       
Absolute Ban: Private Work Spaces 0.102 0.303 0.106 0.307 0.088 0.283 
Absolute Ban: Restaurant 0.454 0.498 0.459 0.498 0.435 0.496 
Absolute Ban: Bars 0.188 0.391 0.198 0.399 0.150 0.357 
Weak Ban: Private Work Spaces 0.469 0.499 0.466 0.499 0.481 0.500 
Weak Ban: Restaurant 0.116 0.320 0.122 0.328 0.089 0.285 
Weak Ban: Bars 0.036 0.187 0.036 0.185 0.038 0.192 
Weighted Ban Index 2.30 2.64 2.37 2.68 2.03 2.45 
Other Control Variables       
Real Income 28,533 22,215 29,938 22,796 23,103 18,855 
Unemployed 0.034 0.182 0.028 0.165 0.059 0.235 
Not in Labor Force 0.328 0.469 0.343 0.475 0.268 0.443 
Not a High School Graduate 0.170 0.376 0.163 0.370 0.197 0.398 
Some College 0.268 0.443 0.265 0.441 0.283 0.450 
College Graduate 0.250 0.433 0.284 0.451 0.119 0.324 
Metro Area 0.741 0.438 0.748 0.434 0.713 0.452 
Age 45.9 17.6 46.8 18.1 42.1 14.6 
Married 0.575 0.494 0.601 0.490 0.477 0.499 
Widowed 0.075 0.263 0.080 0.272 0.052 0.221 
Divorced 0.136 0.343 0.114 0.317 0.224 0.417 
Female 0.563 0.496 0.573 0.495 0.521 0.500 
Black 0.080 0.271 0.080 0.272 0.079 0.270 
Other Race 0.049 0.215 0.049 0.216 0.047 0.211 
N 782,846  622,593  160,253  
 
 
By January 1, 2007, 21 states had enacted complete smoking bans in workplaces, 
22 in restaurants, and 15 in bars.  Of the sample, 10 percent of individuals were covered 
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by complete workplace smoking bans, 18 percent were covered by complete restaurant 
bans, and 11 percent were covered by complete bar bans.  Given the number of 
workplace bans compared to the number of bar bans, the finding that more individuals 
are covered by complete bar bans than workplace bans is surprising.  The finding results 
from California, with over 7 percent of the total sample, not having a complete workplace 
smoking ban and having a complete bar ban. 
In the 1995-1996 CPS/TUS, only 1.1 percent, 9.9 percent, and 0.0 percent of 
individuals were covered by complete workplace, restaurant, and bar smoking bans 
respectively.  By the 2006-2007 CPS/TUS the percentages were 35.2 percent, 42.9 
percent, and 31.8 percent, a significant increase in the prevalence of complete smoking 
bans. 
Twenty-one percent of the sample smoked, while the average number of 
cigarettes consumed per month was 97.3, however, when the sample is restricted to just 
smokers, the average number of cigarettes consumed per month jumps to 473.0.  The 
average price per pack of cigarettes was $1.74 in constant (1982-84) dollars.  The state 
smoking ban attitude index was 12.6 overall, and the state smoking prevalence rate for 
the sample was 22.3 percent. 
 
Results 
For the probit regression of smoking participation the results are presented in 
Table 3.2 and marginal effects are presented in Table 3.3.  Results for the average 
number of cigarettes consumed regression are presented in Table 3.4 with marginal 
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effects presented in Table 3.5.  In each table four columns of results are presented.  The 
first two columns show the results for the analysis of individual bans, without the 
smoking ban attitude index and then with the smoking ban attitude index included.  The 
next two columns show the results for the regressions with the weighted smoking ban 
index variable, first without and then with the smoking ban attitude index variable.   The 
smoking ban variables are aligned at the top of the table, then the other smoking related 
variables, and finally the other demographic controls are at the bottom of the table.  As a 
reminder, absolute bans completely ban smoking in the establishment, while weak bans 
include restrictions for separate smoking areas without airflow separation or separately 
ventilated rooms. 
In the participation model with all of the individual bans, only the weak bar ban 
was statistically significant.  Weak bar bans were negative and statically significant at the 
0.5 percent level in the specification without the state smoking ban attitude index 
variable, and were insignificant in the specification with the state smoking ban attitude 
index variable.  The estimated marginal effect of the weak bar ban variable was a 
reduction in the predicted probability of smoking by 1.4 points in the specification 
without the smoking ban attitude index. 
For the regressions including the weighted ban index variable instead of each 
individual type of ban, the estimated coefficient in the regression without the smoking 
ban attitude index was statistically insignificant, however, the estimated coefficient in the 
regression with the smoking ban attitude index was statistically significant.  While 
statistically significant, the marginal effect of the weighted ban index was small, with an 
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increase of 0.3 percentage points in the probability of smoking for each 1-point increase 
in the index.  
The state smoking ban attitude index variable was negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.1 percent level in both specifications in which it was included.  The 
estimated marginal effects for each point of increase in the index were a decrease in the 
probability of smoking by 4.6 percentage points in both the regression with individual 
bans and the weighted ban index. 
 
Table 3.2 
The Effect of Complete Smoking Bans on Smoking Prevalence 
Dependant Variable: 
Smoking Status 
All Bans Ban Index 
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index 
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban Variables           
Absolute Ban: Private  
  Work Spaces 
β 0.019 0.022   
se (0.026) (0.027)   
Absolute Ban: Restaurant 
  
  -0.006 0.000   
  (0.035) (0.036)   
Absolute Ban: Bars   0.003 0.007   
  (0.018) (0.014)   
Weak Ban: Private Work Spaces   0.008 0.005   
  (0.018) (0.017)   
Weak Ban: Restaurant 
  
  0.009 0.002   
  (0.022) (0.023)   
Weak Ban: Bars   -0.053** -0.010   
  (0.021) (0.019)   
Weighted Ban Index     0.001 0.003* 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Other Smoking Related Variables       
State Smoking Ban Attitude Index    -0.174***  -0.175*** 
   (0.021)  (0.022) 
State Smoking Prevalence 
  
  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Real Price Of Cigarettes    -0.047** -0.020 -0.049*** -0.022 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) 
Price of Dining Out   -0.019 0.013 -0.020 0.013 
  (0.042) (0.017) (0.043) (0.018) 
Price of Alcohol at Bars   -0.430*** -0.421*** -0.460*** -0.416*** 
  (0.123) (0.120) (0.109) (0.106) 
Age 19 Purchase Restriction   -0.061** -0.047** -0.061** -0.046** 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) 
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Table 3.2 - Continued 
The Effect of Complete Smoking Bans on Smoking Prevalence - 
Continued 
Dependant Variable: 
Smoking Status 
All Bans Ban Index 
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index 
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
Other Control Variables      
Real Family Income   -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Not a High School Graduate   -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.075*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Some College   -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
College Graduate   -0.569*** -0.569*** -0.569*** -0.569*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Metro Area   -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age   -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married   -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Widowed   -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Divorced   0.427*** 0.427*** 0.427*** 0.427*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Female   -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Black   -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Other Race   -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Unemployed   0.232*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Not in Labor Force   -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.158*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant  0.253** 2.260*** 0.271** 2.276*** 
  (0.117) (0.252) (0.109) (0.258) 
Model Statistics       
chi2(28, 29, 24, 25)  46,757 46,465 43,219 55,285 
P  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N  782,846 782,846 782,846 782,846 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
 
Smoking prevalence was positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
in all regressions, with each one-percentage point increase in smoking prevalence in a 
state increasing the predicted probability of smoking by 0.2 percentage points.  The 
estimated coefficient on the price of cigarettes was negative in all the specifications, but 
only statistically significant in the specifications without the smoking ban attitude index 
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variable.  The estimated marginal effects of a $1.00 increase in price were decreases of 
1.2 to 1.3 percentage points in the predicted probability of smoking.   The price measure 
for restaurant meals in the participation regressions were not significant, however, the 
price proxy for alcohol at a bar was negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  Because the price measure for alcohol is a proxy measure, there is no meaningful 
marginal effect that could be calculated. 
The minimum purchase age of 19 decreased the probability of smoking in every 
regression at the 5 percent significance level.  The marginal effect of an increase in the 
legal minimum age of purchase was a decrease of between 1.2 and 1.6 percentage points.  
Income was negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all of the 
regressions.  The marginal effects indicate every $10,000 increase in real income 
decreased the probability of smoking by 1.5 percentage points.  For the other 
demographic control variables, the results were similar to previous studies. 
The results from the conditional demand equations show that complete private 
bans were negatively related to consumption, but the result wasn’t statistically significant 
with or without the ban attitude index.  Surprisingly, the estimated coefficient for the 
complete restaurant ban variable was positive and statistically significant at the 10 
percent level in both regressions.  Complete bar bans decreased consumption and were 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the regression without the ban attitude 
index and at the 1 percent level when the ban attitude index was included. 
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Table 3.3 
Marginal Effect of Complete Smoking Bans on Smoking Prevalence
Dependant Variable:  
Smoking Status 
All Bans Ban Index 
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index 
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban Variables          
Absolute Ban: Private  
  Work Spaces 
β 0.005 0.006   
se (0.007) (0.007)   
Absolute Ban: Restaurant 
  
 -0.002 0.000   
 (0.009) (0.010)   
Absolute Ban: Bars  0.001 0.002   
 (0.005) (0.004)   
Weak Ban: Private Work Spaces  0.002 0.001   
 (0.005) (0.005)   
Weak Ban: Restaurant 
  
 0.003 0.001   
 (0.006) (0.006)   
Weak Ban: Bars  -0.014** -0.003   
 (0.006) (0.005)   
Weighted Ban Index    0.000 0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Other Smoking Related Variables      
State Smoking Ban Attitude Index   -0.046***  -0.046*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
State Smoking Prevalence 
  
 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Real Price Of Cigarettes   -0.012** -0.005 -0.013*** -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Price of Dining Out      
     
Price of Alcohol at Bars      
     
Age 19 Purchase Restriction  -0.016** -0.012** -0.016** -0.012** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Real Income  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
 
For the weak bans, both the private worksite and restaurant ban variables were 
positive but not statistically significant.  The estimated coefficient on the weak bar ban 
variable was negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The average marginal effect of a complete restaurant smoking ban was an 
increase of between 32.4 and 33.7 cigarettes per month.  The decrease in consumption 
from complete bar bans was between 20.2 and 21.0 cigarettes per month, while a weak 
bar ban was predicted to decrease consumption between 22.8 and 30.1 cigarettes per 
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month.  The smoking ban attitude index variable was negative and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level.  The marginal effect of an increase in the smoking ban attitude 
index of one-point was a reduction in consumption of 31.5 to 31.8 cigarettes per month.   
 
Table 3.4 
The Effect of Complete Smoking Bans on the Average Number 
of Cigarettes Smoked per Month by Smokers 
Dependant Variable: 
Average Number of Cigarettes 
Smoked 
All Bans Ban Index 
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index 
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban Variables           
Absolute Ban: Private  
  Work Spaces 
β -0.010 -0.009   
se (0.027) (0.026)   
Absolute Ban: Restaurant 
  
  0.069* 0.072*   
  (0.039) (0.038)   
Absolute Ban: Bars   -0.045** -0.043***   
  (0.018) (0.016)   
Weak Ban: Private Work Spaces   0.012 0.011   
  (0.020) (0.019)   
Weak Ban: Restaurant 
  
  0.014 0.012   
  (0.027) (0.025)   
Weak Ban: Bars   -0.064*** -0.048***   
  (0.018) (0.017)   
Weighted Ban Index     0.001 0.002 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Other Smoking Related Variables       
State Smoking Ban Attitude Index    -0.068***  -0.067*** 
   (0.023)  (0.023) 
State Smoking Prevalence 
  
  0.004* 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Real Price Of Cigarettes    -0.042* -0.032 -0.052** -0.042 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) 
Price of Dining Out   -0.005 0.006 -0.010 0.002 
  (0.039) (0.028) (0.043) (0.033) 
Price of Alcohol at Bars   -0.057 -0.049 -0.053 -0.032 
  (0.114) (0.112) (0.109) (0.107) 
Age 19 Purchase Restriction   0.060** 0.065** 0.062** 0.068*** 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
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Table 3.4 - Continued 
The Effect of Complete Smoking Bans on the Average Number 
of Cigarettes Smoked per Month by Smokers - Continued 
Dependant Variable: 
Average Number of Cigarettes 
Smoked 
All Bans Ban Index 
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
 No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
 Other Control Variables       
Real Family Income   -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Not a High School Graduate   -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Some College   -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.076*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
College Graduate   -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.264*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Metro Area   -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age   0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Married   0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Widowed   -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Divorced   0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female   -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Black   -0.379*** -0.379*** -0.379*** -0.379*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Other Race   -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.171*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Unemployed   0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Not in Labor Force   0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant  6.153*** 6.932*** 6.162*** 6.925*** 
  (0.097) (0.274) (0.102) (0.278) 
 Model Statistics       
chi2(28, 29, 24, 25)  18,202 26,312 15,906 19,240 
P  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N  160,253 160,253 160,253 160,253 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
 
For the smoking prevalence variable the coefficient was positive and significant at 
the 10 percent level in the regressions with the individual bans and at the 5 percent level 
in the regressions with the weighted ban index variable.  A one-percentage point increase 
in the prevalence of smoking increased the number of cigarettes smoked by between 1.7 
and 1.8 cigarettes per month.  
66 
The cigarette price variable was negative in all four of the specifications, although 
it was only statistically significant in the regressions without the smoking ban attitude 
index variable.  The marginal effect of an increase in the price of cigarettes was a 
reduction in consumption of between 20.0 and 24.3 cigarettes per month for each dollar 
of increase in the cigarette price. 
The coefficients for price of dining out and for alcohol at a bar were generally 
negative, however none were statistically significant.  The minimum age of 19 purchase 
restriction was positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The marginal 
effect of raising the minimum purchase age to 19 was an increase in the monthly average 
consumption of cigarettes between 29.3 and 30 cigarettes.  The coefficient for the real 
income variable was negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  An 
increase of $10,000 decreased consumption by only 2.5 cigarettes per month. 
The significant and positive finding for the weighted ban index in the prevalence 
regression and lack of statistical significance of the ban index in the intensity equation is 
problematic.  Previous studies have shown that smoking bans were effective at reducing 
consumption of cigarettes. 
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Table 3.5 
Marginal Effect of Complete Smoking Bans on the Average Number 
of Cigarettes Smoked per Month by Smokers 
Dependant Variable:  
Average Number of  
Cigarettes Smoked 
All Bans Ban Index 
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index 
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban Variables           
Absolute Ban: Private Work Spaces β -4.495 -4.267   
se (12.777) (12.254)   
Absolute Ban: Restaurant 
  
 32.381* 33.715*   
 (18.372) (17.715)   
Absolute Ban: Bars  -21.015** -20.222***   
 (8.233) (7.569)   
Weak Ban: Private Work Spaces  5.746 4.979   
 (9.608) (8.992)   
Weak Ban: Restaurant 
  
 6.781 5.469   
 (8.409) (11.927)   
Weak Ban: Bars  -30.061*** -22.729***   
 (8.409) (8.135)   
Weighted Ban Index    0.411 0.777 
   (1.249) (1.227) 
Other Smoking Related Variables      
State Smoking Ban Attitude Index   -31.804***  -31.481*** 
  (10.711)  (10.811) 
State Smoking Prevalence 
  
 1.716* 1.752* 1.799** 1.804** 
 (0.920) (0.938) (0.898) (0.879) 
Real Price Of Cigarettes   -19.936* -15.213 -24.339** -19.572 
 (11.441) (12.538) (10.712) (12.024) 
Price of Dining Out      
     
Price of Alcohol at Bars      
     
Age 19 Purchase Restriction  27.977** 30.412** 29.309** 31.955*** 
 (12.953) (12.155) (12.591) (11.812) 
Real Family Income  -2.466** -2.466** -2.466** -2.469** 
 (1.246) (1.244) (1.245) (1.243) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
 
Because the complete restaurant ban increased the consumption of cigarettes as 
opposed to reducing consumption, a new weighted smoking ban index was constructed 
that excluded restaurant bans.  The regressions were reestimated with the new weighted 
index and the restaurant bans, and the results are presented in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 
Regression Results: Restaurant Bans  
Removed from Weighted Ban Index 
  
Probit Regression 
on Smoking Status 
Zero Truncated Poisson 
Regression on Avg. Number 
of Cigarettes Smoked 
 No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index
No Smoking 
Ban 
Attitude Index 
Smoking Ban
Attitude Index  
Smoking Ban Variables       
Absolute Ban: Restaurant β 0.001 0.010 0.084** 0.087** 
  se (0.039) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038) 
Weak Ban: Restaurant   0.006 0.002 0.028 0.026 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
Weighted Ban Index   0.001 0.003 -0.012** -0.011** 
  0.001 0.003 (0.006) (0.006) 
Other Smoking Related Variables       
State Smoking Ban Attitude Index    -0.175***  -0.070*** 
   (0.022)  (0.023) 
State Smoking Prevalence   0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004* 0.004* 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Real Price Of Cigarettes    -0.048** -0.021 -0.047* -0.037 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) 
Price of Dining Out   -0.018 0.013 -0.005 0.006 
  (0.041) (0.018) (0.038) (0.028) 
Price of Alcohol at Bars   -0.447*** -0.418*** -0.075 -0.061 
  (0.106) (0.108) (0.115) (0.111) 
Age 19 Purchase Restriction   -0.060** -0.046** 0.055* 0.061* 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.033) (0.031) 
Other Control Variables       
Real Family Income   -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.005** -0.005** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Model Statistics       
chi2(26, 27, 26, 27)  47,537 55,432 15,000 17,317 
P  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N  783,742 783,742 160,253 160,253 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
   
The restaurant bans and the new weighted ban index without the restaurants 
included were all insignificant in the probit regression on smoking prevalence.  However, 
in the zero truncated Poisson regression on the average number of cigarettes smoked, the 
absolute restaurant ban was positive as before, but the new weighted ban index was 
negative and statistically significant.  It is likely that prior studies were unaffected by the 
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increase in consumption due to complete restaurant bans as they used data from prior to 
the widespread adoption of complete restaurant smoking bans. 
 
Discussion and Summary 
The results of this study indicate that absolute smoking bans in private worksites, 
restaurants, and bars appear to have little effect on smoking prevalence.  The results for 
the intensity of consumption were mixed, with private worksite bans having no effect, 
restaurant bans increasing consumption, and bar bans reducing consumption.  The lack of 
statistical significance for the statewide workplace bans is likely due to the prevalence of 
smoking bans implemented by private worksites and/or counties and municipalities prior 
to the implementation of the statewide ban. 
Of the weak bans, only weak bar bans had any effect on the prevalence of 
smoking or the intensity of consumption of cigarettes.  However, these bans are rare, with 
only 3 states, Georgia, Missouri, and Nebraska having some type of weak bar smoking 
ban.  It is unclear why weak bans would have a larger effect on the intensity of smoking 
than absolute bans when previous research has shown that complete bans are more 
effective at reducing consumption.  This result needs further investigation and should be 
viewed with caution. 
Two possible explanations for the surprising result that complete restaurant bans 
increased the consumption of cigarettes seem plausible.  First, smokers’ give up dining 
out and eat at home.  Income that was once spent on dining out would be redirected to the 
consumption of other goods including cigarettes.  The effect of restaurant smoking bans 
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on the dining out behavior is addressed in Chapter Three.  If in fact smokers do reduce 
their dining out expenditures, this would support the hypothesis that smokers are 
refraining from frequenting restaurants and instead are eating at home.  
Another possible explanation could be the reaction of restaurants to complete 
bans.  Recently, Adams and Cotti (2007) found that restaurant employment was 
unchanged or grew slightly in counties with restaurant smoking bans, with the largest 
increases found in those areas of the country where the weather permits outdoor seating.  
If restaurants are responding to complete bans with increased outdoor seating options, it 
may be that the bans did not reduce the amount of cigarettes that smokers consumed 
because instead of forcing smokers outside to smoke, the restaurants moved the dining 
out experience outside where the smokers could continue to smoke.  If smokers 
previously would have refrained from smoking in mixed parties of smokers and non-
smokers while indoors, they may not have felt such a compulsion sitting outside because 
they believed they were inconveniencing or harming their non-smoking friends less while 
outside. 
In the absence of the smoking ban attitude index variable, cigarette prices both 
reduced the prevalence and intensity of smoking, although as expected, the effect was 
small.  The price elasticity calculated from the regression with all of the independent bans 
was –0.11, which is lower than the range of –0.25 to –0.47 found in the seven studies 
reviewed by Goel and Nelson (2006).  The reduction of the size of the coefficient 
estimate and statistical significance for the cigarette price variable in the presence of the 
smoking attitude index variable was likely due to the fact that the two variables are 
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highly correlated (ρ = 0. 73).  Both variables increased rapidly after the signing of the 
Master Settlement Agreement between the states’ Attorneys General and the major 
tobacco companies in 1998. 
The addition of the smoking ban attitude index variable to control for sub-state 
smoking bans altered the estimated coefficients on the smoking ban variables slightly, 
and only the weak bar smoking ban variable’s statistical significance changed, becoming 
insignificant.  The smoking attitude index variable had a larger impact on the coefficient 
estimate for the price of cigarettes, which became smaller and insignificant in every 
regression in which the attitude index was included. 
The effect of the other price variables indicates that the price of restaurant meals 
has no effect on cigarette consumption.  The price of alcohol at bars was negatively 
related to the consumption of cigarettes, both the prevalence and intensity of 
consumption, although only the prevalence estimates were statistically significant.  
Alcohol should be regarded as a compliment to smoking. The minimum age purchase 
restriction results reduced the prevalence of smoking but increased the average monthly 
consumption.  The increase in average consumption was likely due to a decrease in 
prevalence among younger smokers who typically smoke less.  Prevalence rates fell 3.0 
percentage points from 23.2 percent to 20.2 percent among individuals less than 19 in the 
states which implemented the higher age limit, compared to a decrease of 2.6 percentage 
points, from 22.5 percent to 19.9 percent, for those aged 19 and older.  These results 
should be viewed with caution, as only a very small portion of the sample was under 19 
and resided in states that implemented higher minimum age purchase legislation. 
72 
The conclusions of the paper are that complete smoking bans appear to have no 
impact on the prevalence of smoking, and have a mixed impact on the intensity of 
cigarette consumption.  While complete bar bans do reduce the number of cigarettes 
smoked, complete restaurant bans have the opposite effect, increasing the number of 
cigarettes smoked on average.  Complete private worksite bans did not have an effect on 
consumption, however, a state’s overall severity of smoking restrictions as measured by 
weighted index of private and bar bans did show that bans reduce consumption. 
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 Appendix A: Smoking Ban Attitude Index Calculation 
Attitudes towards smoking bans are probed in most waves of the CPS-TUS.  The 
CPS-TUS data was available for all years except 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005.  A 
linear extrapolation from the available years was used to estimate the smoking attitude 
index for the missing years.  
Questions about attitudes towards smoking bans in restaurants, work areas, bars, 
and indoor sporting events are consistently asked.  Possible answers to the questions are: 
“1-Allowed in all areas”, “2-Allowed in some areas”, or “3-Not allowed at all”. 
In addition, the respondent’s home smoking policy is also probed, with the 
following responses: “1-No one is allowed to smoke anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”, 
“2-Smoking is allowed in some places or at some time INSIDE YOUR HOME”, “3-
Smoking is permitted anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”. 
To construct the index, first the home smoking policy variable was recoded so 
that higher values reflected stronger anti-smoking sentiment: “1-Smoking is permitted 
anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”, “2-Smoking is allowed in some places or at some 
time INSIDE YOUR HOME”, and “3-No one is allowed to smoke anywhere INSIDE 
YOUR HOME”. 
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The individual responses were summed, then averaged by state and year to derive 
a state attitude index for each year.  The formula is to calculate an individual’s attitude 
index is as follows: 
Smoking Attitude Index  = Restaurant Attitude + Work Area Attitude 
+ Bar Attitude + Indoor Sporting Events Attitude 
+ (4-Home Smoking Policy) 
 
To test if these five questions measure the same idea, attitude towards smoking, 
Cronbach's alpha (reliability coefficient) was calculated.  The reliability coefficient was 
0.76, indicating that the 5 items all measured the same underlying attitude of the 
respondent. 
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Appendix B: Demographic Variables from the Current Population Survey Utilized  
 
Real Income   
Education  Not A High School Graduate 
Some College 
College Graduate 
High School Graduate - Reference Category 
Metro Area  Metro  
Non-Metro – Reference Category 
Age   
Marital Status  Married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Single - Reference Category  
Female  Male – Reference Category 
Race  Black 
Other Race 
White - Reference Category  
Employment Status  Unemployed 
Not In Labor Force 
Employed - Reference Category 
CPS/TUS Survey Wave  2006-2007 Survey 
2003 Survey 
2001-2002 Survey 
1998-1999 Survey 
1995-1996 Survey - Reference Category 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF COMPLETE SMOKING BANS IN RESTAURANTS  
ON DINING OUT EXPENDITURES 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 1990’s a growing number of local governments and states have 
completely banned smoking in restaurants and bars.  Proponents of smoking bans argue 
that government regulation is required to protect the health of workers and patrons in 
restaurants and bars because of externalities associated with second-hand smoke caused 
by the smoking of cigarettes.  Opponents argue that smoking bans will reduce restaurant 
revenues and employment. 
Surveys of owners and managers of restaurants and bars indicated that they 
believed they would lose business if smoking bans were enacted.  However, when the 
economic effect of smoking bans has been examined by using sales tax collections or 
employment levels, either no effect or a small positive effect from the bans was found.  
One potential explanation for these contradictory results is that any loss in business due 
to smokers was offset by increases in business due to non-smokers. 
While previous studies of the effect of smoking bans on dining out expenditures 
have used aggregate data, such as employment and sales tax receipts or perceptions of 
restaurant proprietors and managers, none has investigated how individual consumers 
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react to smoking bans.  The disaggregated effects of smoking bans may be very different 
from the aggregate effect.  
Using household level micro data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), the paper examines how smoking bans alter expenditures on food away from 
home.  By separating the sample and estimating separate regressions for households with 
smokers and without, the paper will attempt to identify differences in the responses to the 
smoking bans between the non-smoker and smoker households.  Presumably, households 
with smokers decreased their expenditures on dining out in response to complete 
restaurant smoking bans, while households without smokers increased their expenditures 
on dining out. 
This essay contributes to the literature by using household data for the first time to 
explore the presumably different effect that smoking bans have on households with 
smokers and those households that contain only non-smokers.  Additionally it introduces 
a readily available measure to control for the price of dining out. 
The paper is organized as follows; first a review of the literature on the effect of 
smoking bans on dining out expenditures is presented.  Then, because the essay will be 
using household data, a review of the food away from home literature is presented, 
followed by the modeling framework.  The data are described, followed by the results, 
with a discussion and summary section concluding the paper. 
  
78 
Literature Review – The Effect of Smoking Bans on Dining Out Expenditures 
In the last 15 years, numerous states, counties, and municipalities, have 
implemented complete smoking bans in restaurants.  The bans have prompted fierce 
debates.  Opponents of smoking bans argued the bans would significantly lower revenues 
and profits of restaurants and in turn reduce employment in the food service sector, while 
proponents argued that the workers’ health would improve and the negative impacts of 
the bans would be small or non-existent. 
Studies done utilizing restaurant managers and owners’ opinions showed that they 
believed complete smoking bans negatively impact their businesses (Dunham and 
Marlow, 2000; Sollars and Ingram, 1999; and The Craig Group, Inc, 1998).  This 
perception of economic losses from smoking bans was due in part to an early study done 
by the Beverly Hills Restaurant Association (BHRA).  The BHRA commissioned a 
survey of its member restaurants on the effect of a local ban on smoking in 1987.  Survey 
respondents reported a 30% decline in sales.  This same number later appeared in a 
survey of restaurants in Bellflower, a Los Angeles suburb.  The Tobacco Institute, a 
tobacco industry research group, then promoted the results of the Bellflower survey in 
numerous restaurant trade publications31.  However, based on administrative data, sales in 
Beverly Hills dropped by 6.7% according to sales tax data while in Bellflower they 
increased by 2.4%. 
Early investigations of the effects of smoking bans that used data such as sales tax 
receipts or employment data showed either no impact or slight increases in business 
                                                 
31 "Self-Serving Surveys: The 30% Myth", Consumer Reports, May, 1994 
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(Glantz and Smith, 1994 and 1997; Glantz and Charlesworth, 1999; Hyland and 
Cummings, 1999; Cremieux and Ouellette, 2001; Hyland, 2002).  Recently, Adams and 
Cotti (2007) found that restaurant employment was unchanged or grew slightly in 
counties with complete restaurant smoking bans, with the largest increases found in those 
areas of the country where the weather permits outdoor seating.   
Scollo et al., 2003, examined the relationship between the findings of studies and 
the funding source for the study.  Of the studies funded by government, health related 
organizations, or independent market research organizations, none found a negative 
economic impact compared to 94 percent of studies funded by tobacco companies or 
affiliated groups that found a negative economic impact.  In addition, the studies that 
found a negative impact were 4 times as likely to use a subjective outcome measure and 
20 times more likely to be non-peer reviewed.  
Previous studies into the effect of complete restaurant smoking bans used 
aggregate data such as employment and sales tax receipts, or perceptions of restaurant 
proprietors and managers.  However, no studies have looked at the effect of smoking 
bans on the individual consumer unit.  The disaggregated effects of smoking bans on 
individual households may be very different from the aggregate effect.  One clue in 
support of this hypothesis that non-smokers and smokers react differently to smoking 
bans comes from the 2004 Zagat New York City Dining Guide Survey.  The survey 
included a question about how New York City’s restaurant smoking ban had changed the 
survey respondent’s dining out frequency.   It found that 4 percent of diners were eating 
out less because of the city’s ban on smoking in public places, 23 percent said that they 
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were eating out more often, and 73 percent said that the ban had not changed their dining 
patterns32. 
Presumably smokers dine out less because smoking bans reduce the enjoyment 
that they experience from dining out, while non-smokers dine out more often because the 
bans reduce the health risks due to second hand smoke and increase their enjoyment of 
the dining out experience.  These two populations should react differently to the presence 
of a smoking ban, which would help explain the conflicting results from the surveys of 
manager and proprietors, and objective data.  If non-smokers increased their expenditures 
on dining out by as much as, or more than smokers reduced their expenditures, the 
aggregate data will show no effect or a slight increases, but restaurants with a higher 
percentage of smokers may have seen declines in business that the aggregate data failed 
to show. 
 
Literature Review – Modeling Food Away From Home Expenditures 
The modeling of Food Away From Home (FAFH) expenditures has a long history 
in the agricultural economics literature.  The FAFH literature has typically used the 
Becker (1965) and Michael and Becker (1973) models of household production as their 
theoretical basis.  Within the household production framework, households use their 
income, non-market time, and purchased commodities to produce household activities 
and goods, including FAFH. 
                                                 
32 2004 Zagat New York City Dining Guide Survey, New York, NY: Zagat Survey, LLC, 2003 
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To date, the FAFH literature has never focused on the role that smoking bans play 
in dining out.  Rather, emphasis has been on other aspects such as; the increased role that 
women play in the workforce and its effect on the decision to purchase FAFH (Kinsey, 
1983; Lee and Brown, 1986; Yen, 1993; Keng and Lin, 2005), the effect that 
demographic variables have had on the consumption of FAFH (McKracken and Brandt, 
1987; and Byrne, Capps, and Saha, 1996), the consumption of FAFH in other countries 
(Mihalopoulos and Demoussis, 2001; Keng and Lin, 2005; Mutlu and Gracia, 2006; and 
Angulo, Gil, and Mur, 2007), the effect that health concerns have had on FAFH (Binkley, 
2006), and the increased consumption of FAFH among seniors (Jang, Ham, and Hong, 
2007). 
Variables used in the study of FAFH included measures of income, a value of 
time measures, and demographic variables33.    A price measure for FAFH has not been 
included in most models as it was generally unavailable.  Because most FAFH studies 
have used cross sectional data, the authors typically assumed that prices did not change 
over the relatively short period of time in which the data were gathered, and that any 
differences in price could be controlled for by the inclusion of regional, state, or other 
control variables.  Even when multiple years of FAFH consumption data were available, 
studies have not included price as an explanatory variable.  Of the two studies that used 
multiple years of data, Byrne, Capps, and Saha utilized repeated cross sectional data and 
did not include prices.  Rather, they assumed that all prices changed at the same rate and 
                                                 
33 Additional detail on the effects of the demographic variables on the purchase of FAFH is given in 
Appendix B. 
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that other descriptive variables would adequately control for price differences.  Angulo, 
Gil, and Mur utilized a panel data set, however, they did not include an explicit measure 
of prices in their analysis. 
 
Modeling Framework 
In order to understand how complete smoking bans may effect the dining out 
decision of smokers and non-smokers, it is important to understand why individuals 
choose to dine out and why individuals smoke, so that the possible channels through 
which smoking bans could effect the dining out decision are understood.  First, why do 
individuals dine out?  Individuals and households dine out primarily for convenience, as a 
recreational and social activity, due to a desire to experience a new type of food, or 
because they are traveling or on vacation34. 
Some of the major reasons individuals begin to smoke include parental and peer 
influences (Flay et. al., 1994), lower levels of education and religiosity (Kendler et. al., 
1999), and weight concerns among females (French et. al., 1994).  In addition, depression 
and anxiety symptoms increase an individual’s susceptibility to peer smoking influences 
(Patton et. al., 1998).  Once individuals begin to smoke, it is extremely difficult to quit 
due to the addictive nature of nicotine (US DHHS, Office of the Surgeon General, 1988). 
For smokers, the complete smoking ban forces the smoker to make a series of 
choices.  The smoker could quit smoking and eliminate the constraint imposed by the 
                                                 
34 Food Trends 2000 study, Strategic Foodservice Solutions. 
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smoking ban.  However, based on the results from Chapter 2, this appears to be an 
unlikely choice as restaurant-smoking bans had no effect on the decision to smoke.   
If the smoker chooses to continue to smoke, the smoker can frequent restaurants 
and refrain from smoking, in which case their expenditures would likely remain the same.  
This would be the case for smokers for whom dining out was a social activity and the 
desire for the social interaction was sufficient to cause the smoker to abstain from 
smoking for short periods of time. 
The smoker can also choose not to frequent restaurants, but rather dine at home 
and consume home cooked meals, prepared meals from the grocery store, or “takeout”.  
If this were the case, then restaurant smoking bans would reduce the expenditures of 
smokers on FAFH. 
An additional possibility suggested by Adams and Cotti was that restaurants 
respond to the imposition of smoking bans by increasing the availability of outdoor 
seating.  If restaurants adapt to the imposition of smoking bans by increasing the amount 
of outdoor seating not subject to the smoking ban, then this would also result in the 
FAFH expenditures of smokers to remain steady. 
For non-smokers, the imposition of a smoking ban does not change the non-
smoker’s decision to smoke at the restaurant, but only the dining out decision.  The 
imposition of a smoking ban eliminates the presence of second hand smoke in the 
restaurant and the risks associated with the second hand smoke.  It should also increase 
the non-smokers enjoyment of the dining out experience.  This effect would tend to 
increase the non-smoker’s expenditures on FAFH.  However, if the non-smoker dines out 
84 
as a social activity with friends who smoke, the imposition of a complete ban may cause 
the non-smoker to dine out less to enjoy the company of their friends if the smokers 
choose not to dine out. 
To model FAFH expenditures by the household, the paper utilizes an empirical 
model similar to what previous studies into FAFH have used, however, the model is 
adapted to analyze the impact that smoking bans have on FAFH.  In addition to the 
income, value of time, and demographic descriptors included in previous studies, this 
study adds a measure for the price of restaurant meals, and most importantly, the smoking 
status of the household and an indicator for the presence of complete restaurant smoking 
bans.   
As detailed in the literature review section, prior studies into FAFH have used the 
household production framework, in which households purchase goods, and together with 
time and effort provided by the household, produce experiences from which they derive 
utility.  For food consumption, households have two options, the household can purchase 
uncooked food and prepare meals at home, or purchase food “ready to eat” at 
restaurants35.  Eating at home and dining out provide two different experiences for the 
household.  Meals consumed at home are cheaper and possibly more nutritious, however 
FAFH may be faster, more convenient, and provide a more enjoyable experience than 
eating at home. 
Because the effect of the smoking ban variable is thought to differ between 
smokers and non-smokers, and the decision to smoke is potentially endogenous, an 
                                                 
35 A third option, “take out” is not considered food away from home. 
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endogenous switching regression is estimated.  Households first choose to be a non-
smoking or smoking household, and then choose their level of FAFH expenditures. 
For the endogenous switching regression, the STATA “movestay” command was 
utilized.  The movestay command uses the full-information maximum likelihood method 
(FIML) to simultaneously fit the binary selection equation and the continuous regressions 
of the model in order to yield consistent standard errors.  Even though the model is 
identified through nonlinearities, the addition of instruments aids in model identification.  
In the binary selection equation, the decision to smoke is modeled as a function of: 
(4.1) Pr(smoke > 0 | pcig, SV, Z) = Φ(τ + ωpcig + γSV + ηZ) 
where: smoke > 0 is measured as someone who has smoked in the past 30 days 
resides in the household; pcig is the price of cigarettes, SV represents non-restaurant 
smoking bans, and Z is a vector of dummy variables of religious participation.  The 
parameters to be estimated are τ, ω, γ, and η, and Φ is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. 
The empirical model estimated using OLS for expenditures is:   
(4.2)   DSBpVe fafhfafh )log(  
where: log(efafh) is the log of food expenditures away from home, V represents 
income, pfafh is the log of the price of FAFH, SB is a matrix of smoking variables 
including smoking bans, D is the other demographic and environmental characteristics, 
and ε is the error term.  The parameters to be estimated are, α, β, δ, Π, and λ.  
Rather than expenditures, the log of expenditures was used as the dependant 
variable for two reasons, first, the distribution of the expenditure variable is positively 
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skewed, and second, the interpretation of the coefficients is more straightforward.  
Because price and income have also been log transformed, the coefficients on the price 
and income variables are interpreted as elasticities and the coefficients on the other 
variables in the model are interpreted as the percent change in FAFH expenditures for a 
1-unit change in the explanatory variable. 
Because of the panel nature of the data, the STATA “xtserial” command was used 
to test the data for serial correlation.  The command implements the test for serial 
correlation in panel data sets developed by Wooldridge (2002).  The test rejected the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation with an F-statistic of: F(1, 3614) = 22.92 for the non-
smoking sample and F(1, 1184) = 9.87 for the smoking sample.   
To correct for the serial correlation, the following method was utilized.  First, the 
data were transformed using xt
* = xt - (ρ * xt-1) where ρ varied by increments of 0.1 from –
1 to 1.  Then, for each increment of ρ the data were retested for serial correlation.  The ρ 
with the smallest F-statistic was then used as the starting point for the next iteration 
where the data were transformed in increments of 0.01 from 0.1 below to 0.1 above the 
best ρ from the first stage.  The final ρ was 0.11, and all of the continuous variables were 
transformed using xt
* = xt - (0.1 * xt-1), while indicator variables remained 0 or 1.   After 
the transformation, testing the data using the Wooldridge method, the H0: of no serial 
correlation could not be rejected, with F(1, 2652) = 0.02 for the non-smoking sample and 
F(1, 759) = 0.002 for the smoking sample. 
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Data 
The dependant variable in the model was food expenditures away from home.  
The main independent variables included a complete restaurant smoking ban variable and 
a state smoking ban attitude variable,36 the log of the price of FAFH, the log of household 
income,37 and food stamp participation as measures of income.  Additional control 
variables included were demographic variables such as the age of the head of household, 
marital status of the head of household, if head of household has a college degree, sex of 
the head of household, if the head of household is non-white, Body Mass Index of the 
head of household, if a member of the household drank alcohol, the size of household, 
and urbanization dummies.  Indicator variables for the presence of a mom at home and 
the head of household employed were used as measures of the time available, and finally 
a time trend was included. 
The following additional variables were used in the selection equation to aid in 
identification of the model, the presence of a complete workplace smoking ban, a 
complete bar smoking ban, the price of cigarettes, an indicator for household health, and 
dummy variables to indicate self identified membership in a religious group38.  These 
variables were chosen because smoking bans and price have been shown to reduce the 
prevalence of smoking (Fichtenberg and Glantz, 2002; Levy and Friend, 2003; Goel and 
Nelson, 2006; and Tauras, 2006), and “nearly all econometric studies of cigarette demand 
                                                 
36 The smoking ban attitude variable is included in the model to control for the presence of less than 
statewide smoking bans because states with high anti-smoking sentiment are likely to have more numerous 
local smoking bans. 
37 Household income was used rather than wage rates as it provided a single measure of the money 
resources available to the household, as opposed to potentially multiple wage rates. 
38 The possible groups were Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and other. 
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use a variety of factors to control for tastes, including gender, race, education, marital 
status, employment status, and religiosity” (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000, pg. 1547).  
Because many of the demographic variables cited by Chaloupka and Warner were 
included in the expenditures equation, they were not included in the selection equation. 
The reported health of the head and wife was used because the Surgeon General 
has concluded that tobacco smoking is the “single greatest cause of avoidable morbidity 
and mortality in the United States” and “smoking generally diminishes the health of 
smokers” (Surgeon General, 2004, Executive Summary pg.1).   Because smoking is so 
harmful to health, the reported health of the head and wife should be inversely related to 
the probability of smoking.  Additionally, data from the 2005 BRFSS showed that 18.2 
percent of the interview subjects who reported being in good, very good, or excellent 
health smoked, compared to 25.8 percent of the respondents who reported fair or poor 
health. 
The data for the study come from the PSID, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
the Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights (ANR), the Current Population Survey – Tobacco 
Use Supplement (CPS-TUS), the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS), 
and the “The Tax Burden On Tobacco, Historical Compilation Volume 43, 2008”. 
The PSID was used for the household level variables including the amount of 
dining out expenditures, household income, household composition and demographics, 
and geographic characteristics.  From the BLS data, the dining out price variable was 
constructed.  Smoking bans were obtained from the ANR, smoking attitudes were 
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obtained from the CPS-TUS, and smoking prevalence from the BRFSS.  Finally, 
cigarette prices were obtained from the “Tax Burden on Tobacco” publication. 
The PSID is a longitudinal study of men, women, and children and the household 
units in which they reside, and is representative when survey design in taken into 
account.  It has been conducted annually from 1968 until 1997, and biannually in odd 
numbered years since, with 2007 the most recent data available. 
This study uses the 1999 through 2007 waves of the PSID for a total of 5 waves 
of data spanning a 9-year time span.  After adjusting for the serial correlation, only 4 
waves of data were available as the first wave was lost in the correction procedure.  In 
2007 roughly 8,300 households participated in the PSID. The response rate for the PSID 
has generally been between 94 and 98 percent39.  The study is conducted by the Survey 
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 
Although the main purpose of the PSID is to collect income and employment 
information, data on a variety of other items has also been collected.  The key piece of 
information for this study collected by the PSID was dining out expenditures.  In 
addition, the PSID provides information about the participants’ demographics, 
employment status, income, health behaviors, and educational attainment.  Participants’ 
state of residence and Beale-Urbanicity code was also included in the data. 
The data on restaurant expenditures was collected as part of the Food section of 
the PSID.  In the Food section, participants were asked about how much they spent on 
                                                 
39 Gouskova, Elena, and Robert F. Schoeni, July 2007, “Comparing Estimates of Family Income in the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the March Current Population Survey, 1968-2005.” Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan  
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food consumed at home, delivered, and dining out.  Dining out expenditures included 
lunches during the workweek, but did not include food consumed at school or work.  
Respondents were not to include delivered food, such as pizza, or already prepared food 
to be consumed at home such as take-out.  Special events such as parties and wedding 
receptions were also not included in the total. 
The actual question about the cost of food away from home in the PSID was 
composed of two parts.  The first part asked the respondent about the amount spent, 
“About how much do you (and everyone else in your family) spend eating out?” and the 
second part recorded the time frame for the amount spent given in response to the first 
question, day, week, two weeks, month, or year.  The data from the PSID on dining out 
expenditures are similar to the dining out data in the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX).  Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2005, compared the expenditure data in the 
PSID to the CEX, and note that trends in food expenditures, food at home and away from 
home, were all very similar and that the means varied by roughly $200.  In addition, 
Charles et al., (2006), showed that “estimates of expenditures in most broad categories 
align closely in the PSID and CE despite substantial differences in their instruments and 
design features” (pg.8). 
Another key variable taken from the PSID was smoking participation.  The PSID 
asked several questions about smoking habits including: “Did you ever smoke 
cigarettes?” and “Do you smoke cigarettes?”  If the reply was positive, a follow-up 
question of “On the average, how many cigarettes per day do you smoke?” was asked. 
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Smoking ban data was obtained from the ANR, a national lobbying organization 
that promotes smoke free workplaces and public spaces.  The ANR provided a list of all 
complete restaurant smoking bans at the state level including the effective date of the 
ban.  The ANR ban data were chosen instead of the ImpactTeen smoking ban data used 
in Chapter Two because 10 of the complete restaurant smoking bans went into effect 
during the middle of a PSID survey year.  The smoking ban dummy variable was created 
by comparing the interview date of the PSID observation to the effective date of any 
restaurant smoking ban for the state.  If the enactment date of the ban was more than 30 
days prior to the interview, then a smoking ban was considered in force.  By January 1, 
2007, 19 states had enacted complete smoking bans in restaurants.  Complete workplace 
and bar ban indicator variables were construed in the same way for use in the selection 
equation of the endogenous switching regression. 
From the CPS-TUS, a smoking sentiment variable was constructed.  The Census 
Bureau conducts the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  Roughly 57,000 households are surveyed each month.  The main purpose of 
the CPS is to collect information on the employment status of those surveyed, however, 
occasionally, the Census Bureau asks supplemental questions about other topics, 
including tobacco consumption and attitudes. 
DeCicca, et al. (2006), examined nine different measures of attitudes towards 
smoking bans, restrictions on tobacco advertising, and home smoking policies from the 
TUS, and found that all nine derive from a common factor that they label “anti-smoking 
sentiment.”  Using the nine measures they constructed an index of attitudes towards 
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smoking.  Because all nine questions were not asked in the more recent Tobacco Use 
Supplements, the smoking ban attitude index was created by using the four available 
questions about attitudes towards smoking bans and the home smoking policy question40.  
The smoking ban attitude variable should help control for the presence of less than 
statewide smoking bans and private restaurant smoking bans because states with high 
anti-smoking sentiment are also more likely to have more numerous local smoking bans. 
Smoking prevalence rates for each state were taken from the BRFSS.  The BRFSS 
is a national health survey conducted annually by all of the States in conjunction with the 
CDC.  The survey collects information on health risk behaviors, health practices, health 
care access and general demographics about the respondents41.  
Price data on cigarettes was obtained from the publication, “The Tax Burden on 
Tobacco, 2008.”  Prices represent the average price for a pack of 20 cigarettes, including 
generic brands, inclusive of state and federal excise taxes on November 1 of each year.  
To match prices more closely to the date of the CPS interview, monthly price data was 
calculated as a linear extrapolation between each November 1st price. 
Because price data for dining out is unavailable, the average annual wage for Full 
Service Restaurants42 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics was used as a proxy for the 
price of restaurant meals.  Average annual pay should provide a reasonable measure of 
restaurant meal prices, because labor represents one-third of the total costs in 
                                                 
40 Compete details about the construction of the state attitude index are given in Appendix A. 
41 The BRFSS survey included all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  In 2006, more than 350,000 
adults were interviewed by phone. 
42 NAICS Codes: 7221 – Full Service Restaurants 
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restaurants43.  Further, examining payroll and operating expenses from the 2007 
Economic Census conducted by the Census Bureau, the ratio of payroll to expenses for 
combined Food services and drinking places sector was 0.448, showing that payroll 
represented roughly have of the expenses for the sector. 
Several studies have found correlation between the wages and prices, although the 
direction of the causation was mixed in the studies.  Pu, Flaschel, and Chihying (2006) 
find that price inflation caused wage inflation in the United States’ economy, while Ghali 
(1999) found that the process ran from wages to prices.  Aaronson (2001) looked 
specifically at the restaurant industries in the U.S. and Canada and also found that prices 
rose with wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1994) determined that restaurants in New 
Jersey raised prices sufficiently to cover the cost of an increase in the minimum wage.   
Even though the direction of the causation may be in doubt, this suggests that while 
imperfect, average annual pay is a reasonable proxy for prices and should capture some 
of the variability in prices for FAFH across time and states.  Using the average annual 
pay and an average cost of $32.60 for a meal at a restaurant in 2005 nationally, 44 a cost 
for each state was calculated in order to scale the price appropriately.  
The Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) all items index from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics was used to deflate all of the monetary measures into real 
dollars.  In all, there were a total of 38,516 observations in the PSID from 1999 to 2007.  
After adjusting for serial correlation and missing data, a total of 20,675 observations that 
                                                 
43 National Restaurant Association, Restaurant Industry Operations Report, 2003 
44 Zagat's 2006 America's Top Restaurants Survey,as reported by CNN Money at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/22/pf/meals_averagecost/index.htm 
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reported expenditures on FAFH and were used in the switching regression analysis while 
4,113 observations reported no expenditures on FAFH45.  Of the observations with 
reported dining out expenditures, 15,334 of the observations were in households in which 
no household member smoked and 5,341 observations were in households in which at 
least one member of the household smoked. 
Table 4.1 contains descriptive means of the variables for the entire sample and for 
smokers and non-smokers.  The mean expenditure on dining out was $1,990 in real 2001 
dollars.  Non-smokers spent more than smokers on FAFH, the difference was $2,046 
versus $1,831.  Part of the difference in expenditures could have been due to non-
smokers lived in higher priced areas.  For all households, the mean price was $26.04, 
while for non-smoker households it was $26.24 and $25.46 for households with smokers. 
Almost twenty percent of households lived in a state with a complete restaurant 
smoking ban.  In 2001, only 10,0 percent of households lived in states with complete 
restaurant smoking bans, but the percentage rose to 35.1 percent in 2007.  Non-smoker 
households were more likely to live in states with complete restaurant smoking bans than 
households with smokers, at 21.7 percent versus 14.5 percent.  The state smoking ban 
attitude was nearly equal between non-smokers and smokers, at 12.9 overall and for the 
nonsmokers, and 12.8 for the smokers.  From 2001 to 2007, the smoking ban attitude 
index increased from 12.5 in 2001 to 13.1 in 2007, meaning that support for smoking 
bans grew over the time period. 
                                                 
45 The 4,113 observations with zero reported food away from home expenditures represented 16.6% of the 
observations. 
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Table 4.1 
Food Away From Home: Summary Statistics 
  All Observations Non-Smokers Smokers 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
Dining Out Variables       
Expend on FAFH ($2001) 1,990 1,981 2,046 2,049 1,831 1,763 
Price of Dining Out  ($2001) 26.04 3.93 26.24 3.95 25.46 3.83 
Smoking Related Variables       
Complete Smoking Ban: Restaurant 0.199 0.399 0.217 0.412 0.145 0.353 
St. Smoking Ban Attitude Index 12.9 0.5 12.9 0.5 12.8 0.5 
Income Variables       
Household Income ($2001) 66,532 92,516 70,850 101,226 54,135 59,231 
Household on Food Stamps 0.063 0.243 0.050 0.218 0.100 0.300 
Value of Time Variables       
Stay at home mom in household 0.138 0.345 0.141 0.348 0.128 0.334 
Head Employed 0.782 0.413 0.778 0.416 0.796 0.403 
Demographic Variables        
Age of Head of Household 46.0 15.0 47.2 15.6 42.8 12.6 
Head of Household Married 0.593 0.491 0.612 0.487 0.541 0.498 
Head College Degree 0.286 0.452 0.329 0.470 0.164 0.370 
Head Male 0.760 0.427 0.756 0.429 0.771 0.420 
Head Non-White 0.351 0.477 0.347 0.476 0.363 0.481 
Head - Body Mass Index 28.1 5.3 28.3 5.4 27.4 5.1 
Household Member Drinks 0.693 0.461 0.666 0.472 0.770 0.421 
Household Size 2.8 1.4 2.8 1.4 2.8 1.5 
Metro area 0.414 0.492 0.428 0.495 0.372 0.483 
Large city 0.250 0.433 0.250 0.433 0.249 0.432 
Medium City 0.076 0.265 0.078 0.268 0.072 0.258 
Adjacent City 0.106 0.308 0.101 0.301 0.121 0.326 
Rural 0.030 0.170 0.028 0.164 0.036 0.186 
Rural 2.374 0.939 2.325 0.942 2.518 0.917 
Instruments for Smoking Status       
Complete Smoking Ban: Work Places 0.095 0.293 0.100 0.300 0.079 0.270 
Complete Smoking Ban: Bar 0.158 0.365 0.174 0.379 0.114 0.318 
Cigarette Price (2001 cents) 357 59 358 59 354 58 
State Smoking Prevalence 0.218 0.035 0.216 0.035 0.223 0.033 
Household Health 2.4 0.9 2.3 0.9 2.5 0.9 
Catholic  0.194 0.396 0.201 0.401 0.174 0.379 
Protestant 0.622 0.485 0.622 0.485 0.623 0.485 
Other Religion 0.024 0.218 0.022 0.210 0.029 0.240 
Jewish 0.022 0.146 0.026 0.160 0.008 0.090 
N 20,675  15,334  5,341  
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Results 
Results of the expenditure on FAFH analysis are presented in Table 4.2.  Results 
for the smoking ban variables are discussed first, then the price and income variables, and 
finally all of the other variables are only very briefly discussed.   
The model was statistically significant, with a Wald test of the joint significance 
of the explanatory variables that rejects the null that all of variables were equal to zero 
with a test statistic of Wald chi2(21)=1,323.  Additionally, the correlation coefficients ρ0 
and ρ1 were both positive and statistically significant different from zero.  Because ρ0 and 
ρ1 were significantly different from zero, this indicates that the error term in the decision 
to smoke equation is correlated with the error term in the FAFH expenditure equation.  
The positive sign on the coefficient for the ρ1 term indicates that the same unobservables 
that cause someone in the household to choose to smoke, also cause that household to 
have higher expenditures on FAFH than the average household conditional on all other 
variables.  The opposite it true for the households with only non-smokers, the 
unobservable factors that cause them to be a non-smoking household also lower their 
expenditures compared to an average household conditional on all other variables.   
Households with smokers would be higher than average spenders as both a non-smoking 
household and as a smoking household.  
For the smoking ban variable, the estimated coefficient on the complete restaurant 
smoking ban variable was positive and insignificant for the non-smoking households at 
0.012. Because the dependent variable was the log of expenditures, the coefficient 
represents the percent change in expenditures when a smoking ban went into effect.  For 
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the smoking households, the estimated coefficient was a negative 4.3 percent, which was 
also insignificant.  
 
Table 4.2 
Food Away From Home: Regression Results 
Dependant  Variable: 
Log(Expenditures on FAFH) 
Endogenous Switching Regression 
Non- 
Smokers Smokers 
Smoking Related Variables     
Restaurant Smoking Ban 0.012 -0.043 
  (0.028) (0.045) 
St. Smoking Attitude -0.153*** -0.086* 
  (0.032) (0.048) 
Price and Income Related Variables   
Price 0.334*** 0.551*** 
  (0.089) (0.140) 
Household Income 0.189*** 0.140*** 
  (0.017) (0.020) 
Food Stamp Participation -0.308*** -0.405*** 
  (0.040) (0.048) 
Value of Time Variables   
Mom at home -0.056** -0.039 
  (0.024) (0.039) 
Head of Household Employed 0.103*** 0.071* 
  (0.025) (0.037) 
Demographic Variables   
Age - Head of Household -0.001 -0.008*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Head of Household Married -0.074*** -0.051 
  (0.028) (0.038) 
Head of Household - College Grad 0.078*** 0.130*** 
  (0.021) (0.042) 
Head of Household Male 0.289*** 0.264*** 
  (0.029) (0.040) 
Head Non-white -0.065*** -0.036 
  (0.021) (0.032) 
BMI - Head of Household 0.004** 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Household Member Drinks Alcohol 0.114*** 0.061* 
  (0.018) (0.032) 
Household Size 0.017** 0.018 
  (0.008) (0.012) 
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Table 4.2 - Continued 
Food Away From Home: Regression Results - Continued 
Dependant Variable: 
Log(Expenditures on FAFH) 
Endogenous Switching Regression 
Non- 
Smokers Smokers 
Urbanization Variables   
Metro Area 0.128*** 0.232*** 
  (0.031) (0.047) 
Large City 0.085*** 0.146*** 
  (0.031) (0.047) 
Medium City 0.018 0.069 
  (0.040) (0.065) 
Adjacent to Metro -0.014 0.024 
  (0.034) (0.055) 
Rural -0.059 -0.061 
  (0.065) (0.085) 
Other Variables   
Time Trend 0.004 0.015*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) 
Constant -2.349 -26.758** 
  (6.223) (10.985) 
ρ 0.834*** 0.284*** 
 (0.012) (0.062) 
Model Statistics   
Wald chi2(21) 1,323.2 
p 0.000 
N (20,675 total) 15,334 5,341 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The state smoking ban attitude index variable was negative and statistically 
significant for both non-smoking and smoking households, with estimated coefficients of 
-0.153 and -0.086 respectively.  For non-smoking households, the price of dining out 
proxy variable was a positive 0.334 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
while for smoking households it was also statistically significant at the 10 percent level at 
a positive 0.551. 
For the measures of income, the estimated coefficients on income were 0.189 and 
0.140 for non-smoking and smoking households, and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in both.  Food stamp program participation was negatively associated with 
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expenditures at –0.308 and –0.405 and significant at the 0.1 percent level.  The results for 
the value of time variables were as expected.  The mom at home variable was negative 
for both groups, but only statistically significant for the non-smokers.  As expected, the 
head employed variable was positive and significant for both non-smokers and smokers. 
To check the sensitivity of the analysis, regressions were reestimated for the early 
years and the last years of the data.  First, the analysis was restricted to 2001-2005 and 
then to 2003-2007.  Results for the smoking ban variable and the state smoking ban 
attitude index variable are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3  
Food Away From Home: Regression Results – 
Specification Checks 
Dependant Variable: 
log(Dining Out Expend) 
Non- 
Smokers Smokers 
Base Results   
Restaurant Smoking Ban 0.012 -0.043 
  -0.028 -0.045 
St. Smoking Ban Attitude Index -0.153*** -0.086* 
  -0.032 -0.048 
Data from 1999 - 2005 utilized   
Restaurant Smoking Ban 0.008 -0.055 
  -0.029 -0.049 
St. Smoking Ban Attitude Index -0.176*** -0.128** 
  -0.037 -0.056 
Data from 2001 - 2007 utilized   
Restaurant Smoking Ban 0.031 0.058 
  -0.036 -0.061 
St. Smoking Ban Attitude Index -0.155*** -0.130** 
 -0.036 -0.056 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
When the sample was limited to just the years 2001-2005 and to 2003-2007, the 
results differed somewhat between the modified regression and the base specification.  In 
the 2001-2005 specification, the coefficients were slightly different in magnitude; 
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however, they were all of the same sign and significance.  For the 2003-2007 sample, the 
coefficient estimate on smoking bans for the non-smoking households was larger but still 
not statistically significant.  For the non-smoking households, the coefficient changed to 
positive but was still insignificant. 
 
Discussion and Summary 
Based on the results from Table 4.2, it appears that complete restaurant smoking 
bans do not change the expenditures on FAFH of non-smoking or smoking households.  
While the estimated coefficients conformed to expectations, the lack of precision in the 
estimates prevents any conclusions from being drawn about the effect of smoking bans.  
However, in related research, the results from an OLS fixed effects approach show 
negative and statistically significant effect of complete restaurant smoking bans on FAFH 
expenditures46.  The results for the state smoking ban attitude index indicated that a 1-
point increase in the smoking ban attitude index reduces the amount that non-smokers 
spend on dining out by 15.3 percent and of smokers by –8.6%. 
In this examination of the decision to dine out, it appears that smoking bans have 
little overall effect on expenditures for food away from home.  The estimated coefficients 
for the smoking ban variable were positive for non-smoking households and negative for 
smoking households, but the errors associated with the estimates were large enough that 
random chance as a driver of the results could not be ruled out.   
                                                 
46 The working paper with the OLS fixed effects results is available on request. 
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The results of the essay do not definitively conclude that smoking bans have no 
effect on dining out.  However, the essay provides a method, coupled with additional data 
on local smoking bans, which could improve the precision of the results and provide a 
more definitive answer. 
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Appendix A: Smoking Ban Attitude Index Calculation 
Attitudes towards smoking bans are probed in most waves of the CPS-TUS.  The 
CPS-TUS data was available for all years except 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005.  A 
linear extrapolation from the available years was used to estimate the smoking attitude 
index for the missing years.  Questions about attitudes towards smoking bans in 
restaurants, work areas, bars, and indoor sporting events are consistently asked.  
Respondents are asked to choose from, “Smoking should be ” - “1) Allowed in all areas”, 
“2) Allowed in some areas”, or “3) Not allowed at all”. 
In addition, the respondent’s home smoking policy is also probed, with the 
following responses: “1-No one is allowed to smoke anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”, 
“2-Smoking is allowed in some places or at some time INSIDE YOUR HOME”, “3-
Smoking is permitted anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”. 
To construct the index, first the home smoking policy variable was recoded so 
that higher values reflected stronger anti-smoking sentiment: “1-Smoking is permitted 
anywhere INSIDE YOUR HOME”, “2-Smoking is allowed in some places or at some 
time INSIDE YOUR HOME”, and “3-No one is allowed to smoke anywhere INSIDE 
YOUR HOME”. 
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The individual responses were summed to form the smoking attitude index.  The 
formula is to calculate an individual’s attitude index is as follows: 
Smoking Attitude Index  = Restaurant Attitude + Work Area Attitude 
+ Bar Attitude + Indoor Sporting Events Attitude 
+ (4-Home Smoking Policy) 
To derive the state smoking attitude index, the individual attitude indexes were 
averaged by state and year to derive a state attitude index for each year.  Each state 
attitude index could theoretically range from 5 to 15, with 5 indicating that every 
individual in the state allowed smoking in every area of their home and believed that 
smoking should be allowed in all areas of restaurants, work places, bars and indoor 
sporting events.  In contrast, a state attitude index of 15 would indicate that every 
individual doesn’t allow smoking in their home at all and believes that smoking should be 
banned in restaurants, work places, bars and indoor sporting events. 
To test if these five questions measure the same idea, attitude towards smoking, 
Cronbach's alpha (reliability coefficient) was calculated.  The reliability coefficient was 
0.76, indicating that the 5 items all measured the same underlying attitude of the 
respondent. 
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Appendix B: Expanded Discussion of Demographic variables used in FAFH Literature 
Demographic variables typically utilized in food away from home (FAFH) studies 
included: an income measure, demographic variables such as; age of the head of 
household, marital status, education, the sex of head, race, size of family, measures of the 
time available to the household, and some sort of location measure such as metro versus 
non-metro.  Additionally, some researchers have focused on how measures related to 
health, such as body mass index and health and nutrition concerns influence FAFH 
consumption.  
Without exception, income has been shown to increase the amount of FAFH 
purchased (Kinsey; Lee and Brown; McKracken and Brandt; Yen; Byrne, Capps, and 
Saha; Mihalopoulos and Demoussis; Keng and Lin; Binkley; Mutlu and Gracia; Angulo, 
Gil, and Mur; and Jang, Ham, and Hong).  The effect of employment or value of time 
was less clear on the level of dining out, with most studies finding no effect, however, 
Yen and then Keng and Lin did find that a working household head was associated with 
higher levels of FAFH consumption. 
Demographic characteristics also influenced the level of dining out expenditures 
as well.  Whites consumed more FAFH than minorities. (Lee and Brown; McCracken and 
Brandt; Yen; Byrne, Capps, and Saha; Binkley; and Jang, Ham, and Hong).  The effect of 
education on the dining out expenditures was been mixed, with Lee and Brown, and Yen, 
finding it decreased the level of expenditures while Mihalopoulos and Demoussis; Keng 
and Lin; and Jang, Ham, and Hong all found that educational attainment increased FAFH 
expenditures.   
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Dining out expenditures increased as the size of the household increased 
(Mihalopoulos and Demoussis; Keng and Lin; Jang, Ham, and Hong; McKracken and 
Brandt; and Byrne, Capps, and Saha).  The effect of family structure on FAFH 
expenditures was unclear, with Byrne, Capps, and Saha finding higher expenditures for 
married families and Lee and Brown and then Mihalopoulos and Demoussis finding a 
negative relationship between marriage and FAFH expenditures.  Byrne, Capps, and 
Saha, and Mihalopoulos and Demoussis found the presence of children decreased dining 
out expenditures, while Keng and Lin and Mutlu and Gracia found no effect. 
For the urbanocity and regional variables, Lee and Brown: Keng and Lin; Byrne, 
Capps, and Saha; Muthi and Garcia; and Angulo, Gil, and Mur all found that households 
in urban areas spent more on FAFH, while Mihalopoulos and Demoussis find that Greek 
consumers in urban areas spent less on FAFH.  Regional effects also matter, as Lee and 
Brown: Yen; Keng and Lin; and Byrne, Capps, and Saha find regional differences in the 
expenditure level for FAFH. 
Finally, Binkley included measures of health status and preferences such as body 
mass index (BMI), frequency of exercise, and measures of nutritional knowledge when 
examining dining out. He found that higher BMIs are both consistent with an increase in 
the number of times individuals frequented both fast food and table restaurants.  
Individuals who were more health conscience tended to dine out less at fast food 
restaurants, but table service was largely unaffected. 
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